

제8회 세계인문학포럼

The 8th WORLD HUMANITIES FORUM 2025

프로그램북 A

: 기조강연, 심포지엄, 안동학 특별강연

PROGRAM BOOK A

: Keynote Speech, Symposium, Special Lecture on Andong Studies

2025. 11. 4(화) ~ 6(목)

4^{Tue} - 6^{Thu} Nov. 2025

안동국제컨벤션센터

Andong International Convention Center

Hall B, Room 201-203

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I PROGRAM SCHEDULE

2025.11.04(화) DAY 1

09:00 - 09:30	등록			
09:30 - 12:00	분과회의 1			
	세션 1 201호 세션 5 207호	세션 2 202호 세션 6 208호	세션 3 203호 세션 7 209호	세션 4 206호 세션 8 210호
12:00 - 13:00	중식			
13:00 - 13:30	개회식 B1F B홀			
13:30 - 15:00	기조강연 1	모하메드 알리 벤마크루프 Mohammed Ali Benmakhlouf 모하메드 6세 폴리테크닉 대학교(UM6P) 교수		B1F B홀
15:00 - 15:30	휴식			
15:30 - 17:30	심포지엄 1	박태웅 의장 독서포럼		201~203호
	심포지엄 2	아메드 나심 바르카위 학장 푸자이라 철학의 집 이희수 명예교수 한양대학교		B1F B홀
18:00 - 19:30	글로벌 네트워킹 디너 1 2F 로비			

2025.11.05(수) DAY 2

09:00 - 09:30	등록			
09:30 - 12:00	분과회의 2			
	세션 1 201호 세션 5 207호	세션 2 202호 세션 6 208호	세션 3 203호 세션 7 209호	세션 4 206호 세션 8 210호
12:00 - 13:30	중식			
13:30 - 15:00	기조강연 2	권현익 Heonik Kwon 케임브리지대학교 트리니티 칼리지 석좌교수		B1F B홀
15:00 - 15:30	휴식			
15:30 - 17:30	심포지엄 3	피니스 찬탈랑시 인문사회 자문관 유네스코 방콕 사무소 석봉래 교수 앨버니아대학교		B1F B홀
	심포지엄 4	문유미 교수 스탠퍼드대학교 곽준혁 교수 중산대학교		201~203호
18:00 - 19:30	글로벌 네트워킹 디너 2 안동 시내			

2025.11.06(목) DAY 3

09:00 - 09:30	등록			
09:30 - 10:10	안동학 특별강연	김언종 Eonjong Kim 한국고전번역원 원장		B1F B홀
10:10 - 11:10	기조강연 3	염재호 Jaeho Yeom 태재대학교 총장		B1F B홀
11:10 - 12:00	폐회식 B1F B홀			
12:00 - 13:00	중식			

2025.11.04 Tue. DAY 1

09:00 - 09:30	Registration			
09:30 - 12:00	Parallel Sessions 1			
	Session 1 Room 201 Session 5 Room 207	Session 2 Room 202 Session 6 Room 208	Session 3 Room 203 Session 7 Room 209	Session 4 Room 206 Session 8 Room 210
12:00 - 13:00	Lunch			
13:00 - 13:30	Opening Ceremony B1F Hall B			
13:30 - 15:00	Keynote Speech 1	Mohammed Ali Benmakhlouf Professor, University of Mohammed VI Polytechnique(UM6P), Morocco		B1F Hall B
15:00 - 15:30	Break			
15:30 - 17:30	Symposium 1	Taewoong Park Chairman, Green Paper Forum		Room 201~203
	Symposium 2	Ahmed Nassim Barqawi Dean, Philosophy House, Fujairah, UAE Heesoo Lee Professor Emeritus, Hanyang University		B1F Hall B
18:00 - 19:30	Global Networking Dinner 1 2F Lobby			

2025.11.05 Wed. DAY 2

09:00 - 09:30	Registration			
09:30 - 12:00	Parallel Sessions 2			
	Session 1 Room 201 Session 5 Room 207	Session 2 Room 202 Session 6 Room 208	Session 3 Room 203 Session 7 Room 209	Session 4 Room 206 Session 8 Room 210
12:00 - 13:30	Lunch			
13:30 - 15:00	Keynote Speech 2	Heonik Kwon Chair Professor, Trinity College, University of Cambridge		B1F Hall B
15:00 - 15:30	Break			
15:30 - 17:30	Symposium 3	Phinith Chanthalangsy Regional Advisor for Social and Human Sciences, UNESCO Bangkok Office Bongrae Seok Professor, Alvernia University		B1F Hall B
	Symposium 4	Yumi Moon Professor, Stanford University Jun-Hyeok Kwak Professor, Sun Yat-sen University		Room 201~203
18:00 - 19:30	Global Networking Dinner 2 Andong Downtown			

2025.11.06 Thu. DAY 3

09:00 - 09:30	Registration			
09:30 - 10:10	Special Lecture on Andong Studies	Eonjong Kim Director, Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics		B1F Hall B
10:10 - 11:10	Keynote Speech 3	Jaeho Yeom President, Taejae University		B1F Hall B
11:10 - 12:00	Closing Ceremony B1F Hall B			
12:00 - 13:00	Lunch			

I PROGRAM DETAILS

2025.11.04 Tue. DAY 1

09:00 - 09:30 등록

09:30 - 12:00 분과회의 1 (AI)

201호 1. AI 윤리

사회 손화철 교수 한동대학교

- 강연 1-1. 정성훈 교수 인천대학교
 1-2. Barbara Janusz-Pohl(바르바라 야누시-폴) 교수 아담 미키에비츠대학교
 1-3. 허유선 교수 경남대학교
 1-4. Ho Manh Tung(호 만 통) 연구원 베트남 사회과학원 철학연구소

토론 고인석 교수 인하대학교
 Michał Wawrzyńczak(마이클 바브진차크) 연구원 아담 미키에비츠대학교, 볼로냐 대학교

202호 2. AI와 인문학 연구

사회 박건우 교수 국립창원대학교

- 강연 2-1. 김바로 교수 한국학중앙연구원
 2-2. Tony Veale(토니 비일) 교수 더블린대학교
 2-3. 전준 교수 카이스트
 2-4. Marcin Galiński(마르친 갈린스키) 교수 고르조프 비엘코폴스키 야곱 파라디스대학교

토론 맹성현 교수 태재대학교

203호 3. AI 시대의 교육(Roundtable)

사회 이찬규 교수 중앙대학교

- 강연 3-1. 도성훈 교육감 인천광역시교육청
 3-2. 엄성우 교수 서울대학교
 3-3. 김현철 교수 고려대학교
 3-4. 김원중 교수 단국대학교

206호 4. AI와 번역

사회 최호빈 교수 국립경국대학교

- 강연 4-1. 임영길 교수 성균관대학교
 4-2. Ke Hu(커 휴) 교수 멜버른대학교
 4-3. 장요한 교수 계명대학교
 4-4. Muhammet Emre Korkmaz(무함메트 에므레 코르크마즈) 교수 앙카라대학교

2025.11.04 Tue. DAY 1

09:30 - 12:00 분과회의 1 (공존)

207호 5. 뮤지움, 포용적 공간

사회 박은경 교수 동아대학교

- 강연 5-1. 박성일 학예연구사 서울대학교 규장각
 5-2. Vicki Sungyeon Kwon(권성연) 학예연구사 로얄 온타리오 박물관
 5-3. 김영희 학예연구사 국립중앙박물관
 5-4. Masao Oi(오이 마사오) 교수 도시사대학교

토론 민병찬 교수 충북대학교

208호 6. 한국의 문학과 세계

사회 김태용 교수 송실대학교

- 강연 6-1. 이승우 소설가 <한국문학>
 6-2. Jean-Claude de Crescenzo(장-클로드 드 크레센조) 교수 엑스 마르세유대학교
 6-3. 정용준 교수 서울예술대학교

209호 7. 디지털시대의 책과 도서관

사회 문경훈 교수 경상국립대학교

- 강연 7-1. 김영욱 교수 서울대학교
 7-2. Guillaume Fau(기욤 포) 문헌실장 프랑스 국립도서관
 7-3. Rafael Olea Franco(라파엘 올레아 프랑코) 교수 클레히오 데 멕시코

토론 우석균 교수 서울대학교
 차지연 교수 충남대학교

210호 8. 타자와의 만남

사회 정세근 교수 충북대학교

- 강연 8-1. 임영진 교수 전남대학교
 8-2. Aditi Singh(아디티 싱) 교수 서울대학교
 8-3. 서민규 교수 건양대학교
 8-4. Suk Gabriel Choi(최석 가브리엘) 교수 타우슨대학교

토론 조남호 교수 국제뇌교육종합대학원대학교

12:00 - 13:00 중식

13:00 - 13:30 개회식

I PROGRAM DETAILS

2025.11.04 Tue. DAY 1

13:30 - 15:00	기조강연 1 (AI)
B홀	사회 김선욱 명예교수 송실대학교
	강연 Mohammed Ali Benmakhoulouf(모하메드 알리 벤마크루프)교수 모하메드 6세 폴리테크닉대학교(UM6P) 인공지능과 인간 대화의 도전
	토론 김혜숙 회장 국제철학연맹(FISP)
15:00 - 15:30	휴식
15:30 - 17:30	심포지엄 1: AI 거버넌스
201~203호	사회 이찬규 교수 중앙대학교
	강연 박태웅 의장 북서포럼
	토론 이중원 명예교수 서울시립대학교 이광호 교수 한국교원대학교
15:30 - 17:30	심포지엄 2: 중동 지역의 공존
B홀	사회 성일광 교수 서강대학교
	강연 Ahmed Nassim Barqawi(아메드 나심 바르카위) 학장 푸자이라 철학의 집 이희수 명예교수 한양대학교
17:30 - 18:00	이동
18:00 - 19:30	글로벌 네트워킹 디너 1

2025.11.05 Wed. DAY 2

09:00 - 09:30	등록
09:30 - 12:00	분과회의 2 (AI)
201호	9. AI와 인간성
	사회 이길산 교수 경남대학교
	강연 9-1. 방종우 교수 가톨릭대학교 9-2. Balaganapathi Devarakonda(발라가나파티 데바라콘다) 교수 델리대학교 9-3. 보일(양성철) 소장 AI 부디즘 연구소 9-4. Johnson Thomaskutty(존슨 토마스쿠티) 교수 유니온 신학대학원
	토론 최성호 선임연구원 서울대학교 아시아연구소
202호	10. AI와 예술
	사회 박평종 교수 중앙대학교
	강연 10-1. 정서현 교수 카이스트 10-2. Alice Barale(앨리스 바라레) 교수 밀라노대학교 10-3. 박진완 교수 중앙대학교
	토론 Wang Jiaqi(왕가기) 고려대학교 박사과정
203호	11. AI와 한국어 교육
	사회 채영희 교수 국립부경대학교
	강연 11-1. 이정희 교수 경희대학교 11-2. Satyanshu Srivastava(사티안슈 수리바스타바) 교수 네루대학교 11-3. 광용진 대표이사 (주)이르테크 11-4. Jieun Joe Kiaer(조지은) 교수 옥스퍼드대학교
	토론 강현화 교수 연세대학교
206호	12. AI와 언어
	사회 권만우 교수 경성대학교
	강연 12-1. 이유미 교수 중앙대학교 12-2. Jean-Louis Vaxelaire(장-루이 박셀레르) 교수 나뮈르대학교 12-3. 박정원 교수 한국외국어대학교 12-4. Seok Kang(강석) 교수 텍사스대학교
	토론 박진호 교수 서울대학교
12:00 - 13:30	중식

I PROGRAM DETAILS

2025.11.05 Wed. DAY 2	
09:30 - 12:00	분과회의 2 (공존)
207호	13. 전쟁과 공존
	사회 김형곤 교수 건양대학교
	강연 13-1. 손경호 교수 국방대학교 13-2. Miklós Zeidler(미클로스 자이들러) 교수 부다페스트대학교 13-3. 김지영 교수 송실대학교 13-4. Linda Sunarti(린다 수나르티) 교수 인도네시아대학교
	토론 박제광 학예실장 건국대학교 박물관
208호	14. 위기와 레질리언스
	사회 김기봉 명예교수 경기대학교
	강연 14-1. 박혜정 전문연구원 연세대학교 14-2. Frank Uekötter(프랑크 우에키테르) 교수 보훔 루르대학교 14-3. 이세진 교수 호서대학교 14-4. Yoshiyuki Yama(야마 요시유키) 교수 간세이가쿠닌대학교
209호	15. 포스트콜로니얼 문화와 민족 문학
	사회 김태용 교수 송실대학교
	강연 15-1. 최성웅 박사 인다출판사 15-2. Melina Balcázar(멜리나 발카사르) 교수 클레히오 데 멕시코 15-3. Kuwada Kohei(코헤이 쿠와다) 교수 도쿄대학교
210호	16. 뉴 노멀시대의 공존(Roundtable)
	사회 정원섭 교수 경남대학교
	강연 16-1. 최훈 교수 강원대학교 16-2. 박상혁 교수 동아대학교 16-3. 성신형 교수 송실대학교 16-4. 정원섭 교수 경남대학교
12:00 - 13:30	중식
13:30 - 15:00	기조강연 2 (공존)
	B홀
	사회 김선욱 명예교수 송실대학교
	강연 Heonik Kwon(권현익) 석좌교수 케임브리지대학교 트리니티 칼리지 인공지능과 사회적 영혼 사이
	토론 박명림 교수 연세대학교

2025.11.05 Wed. DAY 2	
15:00 - 15:30	휴식
15:30 - 17:30	심포지엄 3: AI 편향성
	B홀
	사회 Jin Y. Park(박진영) 석좌교수 아메리칸대학교
	강연 Phinith Chanthalangsy(피니스 찬탈랑시) 인문사회 자문관 유네스코 방콕 사무소 Bongrae Seok(석봉래) 교수 앨버니아대학교
15:30 - 17:30	심포지엄 4: 동아시아의 공존
	201~203호
	사회 양일모 교수 서울대학교
	강연 Yumi Moon(문유미) 교수 스탠퍼드대학교 Jun-Hyeok Kwak(곽준혁) 교수 중산대학교
17:30 - 18:00	이동
18:00 - 19:30	글로벌 네트워킹 디너 2

2025.11.06 Thu. DAY 3	
09:00 - 09:30	등록
09:30 - 10:10	안동학 특별강연
	B홀
	강연 김연중 원장 한국고전번역원 안동의 간략한 역사와 인물들
10:10 - 11:10	기조강연 3
	B홀
	사회 김선욱 명예교수 송실대학교
	강연 염재호 총장 태재대학교 AI시대의 인간: 인간과 AI의 공진화(共進化: Co-Evolution)
11:10 - 12:00	폐회식
12:00 - 13:00	중식

I PROGRAM DETAILS

2025.11.04 Tue. DAY 1

09:00 - 09:30 Registration

09:30 - 12:00 Parallel Sessions 1 (AI)

Room 201

1. AI Ethics

Moderator **Whachul Son** Professor, Handong Global University

Presenters **1-1. Sunghoon Jung** Professor, Incheon National University
1-2. Barbara Janusz-Pohl Professor, Adam Mickiewicz University
1-3. Eusun Heo Professor, Kyungnam University
1-4. Ho Manh Tung Researcher, Institute of Philosophy, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences

Discussants **Insok Ko** Professor, Inha University
Michał Wawrzyńczak Ph.D. Candidate, Adam Mickiewicz University, University of Bologna

Room 202

2. AI and Humanities Research

Moderator **Geonwoo Park** Professor, Changwon National University

Presenters **2-1. Baro Kim** Professor, The academy of Korean Studies
2-2. Tony Veale Professor, University College Dublin
2-3. June Jeon Professor, KAIST
2-4. Marcin Galiński Professor, The Jacob of Paradies University in Gorzów Wielkopolski

Discussant **Sunghyon Myaeng** Professor, Taejae University

Room 203

3. Education in the Age of AI (Roundtable)

Moderator **Chankyu Lee** Professor, Chung-Ang University

Presenters **3-1. Seonghoon Do** Governor, Incheon Metropolitan city office Professor of Education
3-2. Sungwoo Um Professor, Seoul National University
3-3. Hyeoncheol Kim Professor, Korea University
3-4. Wonjoong Kim Professor, Dankook University

Room 206

4. AI and Translation

Moderator **Hobin Choi** Professor, Gyeongguk National University

Presenters **4-1. Younggil Yim** Professor, Sungkyunkwan University
4-2. Ke Hu Professor, The University of Melbourne
4-3. Yohan Jang Professor, Keimyung University
4-4. Muhammet Emre Korkmaz Professor, Ankara University

2025.11.04 Tue. DAY 1

09:30 - 12:00 Parallel Sessions 2 (Coexistence)

Room 207

5. Museums as Inclusive Spaces

Moderator **Eunkyung Park** Professor, Dong-A University

Presenters **5-1. Vicki Sungyeon Kwon** Curator, Royal Ontario Museum (ROM)
5-2. Masao Oi Professor, Doshisha University
5-3. Seongil Park Curator, Kyujanggak Institute, Seoul National University
5-4. Younghee Kim Curator, National Museum of Korea

Discussant **Byoungchan Min** Professor, Chungbuk National University

Room 208

6. Korean Literature and the World

Moderator **Taeyong Kim** Professor, Soongsil University

Presenters **6-1. Seungwoo Lee** Novelist, Magazine 『Korean Literature』
6-2. Jean-Claude de Crescenzo Professor, Aix-Marseille Université
6-3. Yongjoon Jeong Professor, Seoul Institute of The Arts

Room 209

7. Books and Libraries in the Digital Age

Moderator **Kyunghoon Moon** Professor, Gyeongsang National University

Presenters **7-1. Guillaume Fau** Book Curator, Bibliothèque Nationale de France
7-2. Rafael Olea Franco Professor, El Colegio de México
7-3. Younguk Kim Professor, Seoul National University

Discussants **Sukkyun Woo** Professor, Seoul National University
Jiyeon Cha Professor, Chungnam National University

Room 210

8. Encountering the Other

Moderator **Segeun Jeong** Professor, Chungbuk National University

Presenters **8-1. Youngjin Yim** Professor, Chonnam National University
8-2. Aditi Singh Professor, Seoul National University
8-3. Suk Gabriel Choi Professor, Towson University
8-4. Mingyu Seo Professor, Konyang University

Discussant **Namho Cho** Professor, University of Brain Education

12:00 - 13:00 Lunch

13:00 - 13:30 Opening Ceremony

I PROGRAM DETAILS

2025.11.04 Tue. DAY 1

13:30 - 15:00	Keynote Speech 1 (AI)
B1F Hall B	<p>Moderator Seon-Wook Kim Professor Emeritus, Soongsil University</p> <hr/> <p>Presenter Mohammed Ali Benmakhlouf Professor, University of Mohammed VI Polytechnique, Morocco (UM6P) Artificial Intelligence and the Challenges of Human Conversation</p> <hr/> <p>Discussant Heisook Kim President, International Federation of Philosophical Societies</p>
15:00 - 15:30	Break
15:30 - 17:30	Symposium 1: AI Governance
Room 201~203	<p>Moderator Chankyu Lee Professor, Chung-Ang University</p> <hr/> <p>Presenter Taewoong Park Chairman, Green Paper Forum</p> <hr/> <p>Discussants Jungwon Lee Professor Emeritus, University of Seoul Kwangho Lee Professor, Korea National University of Education</p>
15:30 - 17:30	Symposium 2: The Coexistence in the Middle East
B1F Hall B	<p>Moderator Ilkwang Seong Professor, Sogang University</p> <hr/> <p>Presenters Ahmed Nassim Barqawi Dean, Philosophy House, Fujairah, UAE Heesoo Lee Professor Emeritus, Hanyang University</p>
17:30 - 18:00	Transfer
18:00 - 19:30	Global Networking Dinner 1

2025.11.05 Wed. DAY 2

09:00 - 09:30	Registration
09:30 - 12:00	Parallel Sessions 1 (AI)
Room 201	<p>9. AI and Humanity</p> <p>Moderator Gilsan Lee Professor, Kyungnam University</p> <hr/> <p>Presenters 9-1. Jongwoo Bang Professor, The Catholic University of Korea Songsin Campus 9-2. Balaganapathi Devarakonda Professor, University of Delhi 9-3. Boil Director, AI Buddhism Research Institute 9-4. Johnson Thomaskutty Professor, The United Theological College (UTC), Bengaluru</p> <hr/> <p>Discussant Seongho Choi Senior Researcher, Seoul National University Asia Center</p>
Room 202	<p>10. AI and the Arts</p> <p>Moderator Pyungjong Park Professor, Chung-Ang University</p> <hr/> <p>Presenters 10-1. Seohyon Jung Professor, KAIST 10-2. Alice Barale Professor, University of Milan 10-3. Jinwan Park Professor, Chung-Ang University</p> <hr/> <p>Discussant Wang Jiaqi Korea University Ph.D. Candidate</p>
Room 203	<p>11. AI and Korean Language Education</p> <p>Moderator Younghee Chae Professor, Pukyong National University</p> <hr/> <p>Presenters 11-1. Junghee Lee Professor, Kyung Hee University 11-2. Satyanshu Srivastava Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University 11-3. Yongjin Kwak CEO, IIR TECH 11-4. Jieun Joe Kiaer Professor, University of Oxford</p> <hr/> <p>Discussant Hyounhwa Kang Professor, Yonsei University</p>
Room 206	<p>12. AI and Language</p> <p>Moderator Mahnwoo Kwon Professor, Kyungsoong University</p> <hr/> <p>Presenters 12-1. Yumi Yi Professor, Chung-Ang University 12-2. Jean-Louis Vaxelaire Professor, Université de Namur 12-3. Jeongweon Park Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies 12-4. Seok Kang Professor, The University of Texas at San Antonio</p> <hr/> <p>Discussant Jinho Park Professor, Seoul National University</p>

I PROGRAM DETAILS

2025.11.05 Wed. DAY 2

09:30 - 12:00	Parallel Sessions 4 (Coexistence)
Room 207	13. War and Coexistence
	Moderator Hyunggon Kim Professor, Konyang University
	Presenters 13-1. Kyengho Son Professor, Korea National Defense University 13-2. Miklós Zeidler Professor, University of Budapest 13-3. Jiyoung Kim Professor, Soongsil University 13-4. Linda Sunarti Professor, University of Indonesia
	Discussant Jaegwang Park Chief Curator, Konkuk University Museum
Room 208	14. Crises and Resilience
	Moderator Gibong Kim Professor Emeritus, Kyonggi University
	Presenters 14-1. Hyejeong Park Neseach Fellow, Yonsei University 14-2. Frank Uekötter Professor, Ruhr University Bochum 14-3. Sejin Lee Professor, Hoseo University 14-4. Yoshiyuki Yama Professor, Kwansai Gakuin University
Room 209	15. Post-Colonial Culture and National Literature
	Moderator Taeyong Kim Professor, Soongsil University
	Presenters 15-1. Sungwoong Choi Ph.D., Itta Publishing (Director) 15-2. Melina Balcázar Professor, El Colegio de México 15-3. Kuwada Kohei Professor, The University of Tokyo
Room 210	16. Co-Existence in the Age of "The New Normal" (Roundtable)
	Moderator Wonsup Jung Professor, Kyungnam University
	16-1. Hoon Choi Professor, Kangwon National University 16-2. Sanghyuk Park Professor, Dong-A University 16-3. Shinhyung Seong Professor, Soongsil University 16-4. Wonsup Jung Professor, Kyungnam University
12:00 - 13:30	Lunch
13:30 - 15:00	Keynote Speech 2 (Coexistence)
	B1F Hall B Moderator Seon-Wook Kim Professor Emeritus, Soongsil University
	Presenter Heonik Kwon Chair Professor, Trinity College, University of Cambridge Between Artificial Intelligence and Social Soul
	Discussant Myunglim Park Professor, Yonsei University

2025.11.05 Wed. DAY 2

15:00 - 15:30	Break
15:30 - 17:30	Symposium 3: AI Bias
	B1F Hall B Moderator Jin Y. Park Chair Professor, American University
	Presenter Phinith Chanthalangsy Regional Advisor for Social and Human Sciences, UNESCO Bangkok Office Bongrae Seok Professor, Alvernia University
15:30 - 17:30	Symposium 4: Coexistence in East Asia
	Room 201~203 Moderator Ilmo Yang Professor, Seoul National University
	Presenter Yumi Moon Professor, Stanford University Jun-Hyeok Kwak Professor, Sun Yat-sen University
17:30 - 18:00	Transfer
18:00 - 19:30	Global Networking Dinner 2

2025.11.06 Thu. DAY 3

09:00 - 09:30	Registration
09:30 - 10:10	Special Lecture on Andong Studies
	B1F Hall B Presenter Eonjong Kim Director, Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics A Brief History of Andong and Its Notable Figures
	10:10 - 11:10
B1F Hall B	Moderator Seon-Wook Kim Professor Emeritus, Soongsil University
	Presenter Jaeho Yeom President, Taejoo University Humanity in the Age of AI: Co-Evolution of Humans and AI
	11:10 - 12:00
12:00 - 13:00	Lunch

“AI 대전환 시대의 인문학” “공존을 위한 모색”

제8회 세계인문학포럼은 “AI 대전환 시대의 인문학”과 “공존을 위한 모색”을 공동주제로 선정하였다. 인문학은 변화하는 시대를 살피며 인간에 대한 근본적인 질문을 다시 던져 최선의 대답을 제시해야 한다.

AI는 이 시대에 패러다임 전환의 새로운 중심을 이루고 있다. AI 대전환은 우리의 사회와 개인의 삶을 근본적으로 바꾸어 놓고 있다. 다변적 세계의 본질, 인간적 삶의 가능 조건, 변화에 필요한 자질, 변화하는 시대의 윤리와 교육의 방향성, 인간 주체성과 정체성, 문화의 변화, 노동 시장의 변화에 따른 사회경제적 대변혁 등에 대해 인문학은 새로운 지평에서 응답해야 한다.

또한 지금은 자연과 문명의 공존, 문화 간의 공존, 세대 간의 공존, 기술과 인간의 공존 등 인류가 고민하는 많은 문제에 대한 담론이 더 구체화되어야 할 시점이다. 어제와 오늘을 돌아보는 데 그치지 않고, 인문학의 관점에서 내일을 향해 “우리가 무엇을 할 것인가”를 논의해야 한다.

“The Humanities in the Age of AI Transformation” “Exploring Paths to Coexistence”

The 8th World Humanities Forum has selected “The Humanities in the Age of AI Transformation” and “Exploring Paths to Coexistence” as its central themes. Together, they reflect the need for the humanities to revisit fundamental questions about human existence, values, and identity in the midst of rapid technological and societal change.

Artificial intelligence now stands at the heart of a new paradigm, reshaping the ways we think, work, and live. This transformation invites the humanities to engage deeply with questions such as the nature of a multi-layered world, the conditions for meaningful human life, the qualities required to adapt to change, and the evolving directions of ethics and education in the age of AI. It also calls for renewed reflection on human subjectivity and identity, cultural transformation, and the socioeconomic shifts brought about by changes in the labor market.

At the same time, the challenge of coexistence—between nature and civilization, among cultures, across generations, and between technology and humanity—demands a more tangible and forward-looking dialogue. The Forum aims to move beyond reflection on the past and present to ask, from a humanistic perspective, a vital question for our shared future: What can humanity do today to create a better tomorrow?

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인공지능과 인간 대화의 도전

Artificial Intelligence and the Challenges of Human Conversation

Mohammed Ali Benmakhlouf 교수 모하메드 알리 벤마크루프
 모하메드 6세 폴리테크닉대학교(UM6P)
 파리-에스트 크레테이유 대학교 명예교수
 모로코 왕립아카데미 및 프랑스 국립약학아카데미 회원
 아프리카 연구센터(CAS) 소장



Abstract

Artificial intelligence should be better described as a “powerful algorithm” that uses mathematical calculations to perform certain tasks that humans are accustomed to doing. This involves a lot of calculations, statistics, and simulations. It also involves the massive use of big data. While human intelligence, from early childhood onwards, uses little data and manages to compose and create important actions, AI requires a lot of data. Recently, so-called conversational robots, also known as “conversational agents,” have been developed. But, is this really conversation? Having a conversation with someone means talking with your whole body, allowing for silence, sitting or standing, using a tone that changes according to the other person's reaction, and also engaging in a degree of playfulness, to such an extent that it is often playfulness that has been used to describe conversation. In this lecture, I will attempt to compare the requirements of conversation with those of the flow of information to which we are constantly exposed through the paradigm of artificial intelligence, and draw some conclusions from this challenge in terms of human creativity and shared ethics.

Introduction: learning, creating, gaming

Artificial intelligence should be better described as a “powerful algorithm” that uses mathematical calculations to perform certain tasks that humans are accustomed to doing. This involves a lot of calculations, statistics, and simulations. It also involves the massive use of big data. While human intelligence, from early childhood onwards, uses little data and manages to compose and create important actions, AI requires a lot of data.

On this subject, there are at least two very opposing ways of looking at children's learning. Either we say, like Marvin Minsky, a proponent of strong AI, that AI is present in all areas and that it differs little from human intelligence, that our mind is a multi-agent society that constantly divides everything it undertakes into single tasks. As adults, we often forget this decomposition and think that our intelligence is indivisible and spontaneous.

According to Minsky, there is a “relative amnesia about early childhood” that makes us forget how we learned to build small cubes. “This lack of memory makes us believe that all our wonderful abilities have always existed in our minds, and we never stop to wonder how they came about and developed.”

Following the example of linguist Noam Chomsky, we say that children learn with little data and constantly create sentences in a form that cannot be reduced to what AI does: humans, with little data, use negation, imagination, and modalities in a way that AI cannot simulate. They also use what does not happen, what could have happened, and integrate these “negative apprehensions” into their world, thinking that what they exclude is part of their choice.

Noam Chomsky, New York Times, March 8, 2023: “The human mind is not, like ChatGPT and its ilk, a lumbering statistical engine for pattern matching, gorging on hundreds of terabytes of data and extrapolating the most likely conversational response or most probable answer to a scientific question. On the contrary, the human mind is surprisingly efficient and even elegant system that operates with small amounts of information. It seeks not to infer brute correlations about data points but to create explanations. For instance, a young child acquiring a language is developing—unconsciously, automatically and speedily from minuscule data—a grammar, a stupendously sophisticated system of logical principles and parameters”.

Luc Julia is the co-inventor of the Siri voice assistant: “Our intelligence is multimodal: it uses not only what we see, but also our other senses, context, and many other things that are much more difficult to model than an image.”¹⁾

1) Luc Julia, L'intelligence artificielle n'existe pas, Institut Diderot, 14 novembre 2019, p.10.

Not to mention the ludic aspect, made up of absurdity and logic, as Lewis Carroll knew how to do in his writings, particularly in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. Every page of this book fills us with wonder and amazement at the author's boundless creativity. And we celebrate conversation as a challenge to the mind: "Never lose your temper," "Keep your temper," the caterpillar keeps saying to Alice as she faces a strange, even hostile world, a beautiful metaphor for a world that is not tailored to our desires and in which we are called to live.

There are therefore creative faculties, such as this parable of our world seen through the eyes of a child, seemingly lost in her dreams and engaged in constant conversation with all kinds of living beings, faculties that are not projected onto AI to be reinforced in their achievements. Alice lives in a world that puts her to the test.

AI and data status

The other problem I see with AI, apart from the smooth nature of our projections, or even our prejudices that seem to be reinforced, is the problem of cognitive deficits that can lead to greater exposure to vulnerability through AI. In August 2025, Open AI acknowledged that its ChatGPT robot was unable to converse effectively with psychologically vulnerable individuals, and also seems to want to remedy the smooth and servile nature of chatbots, which are extremely docile and say what people want to hear, without offering them any criticism.

We should also mention the addiction induced by chatbots, which make users not attentive to, but captive to, the conversation, isolating them from their surroundings and reinforcing their prejudices by continuously generating data. Let's pause for a moment on the word "data." This word is generally used to indicate that something is imposed on us, such as sensory data: that is, all knowledge gained through familiarity, through the sensory presence of what we see, smell, or hear.

This world of data is very limited. It is generally conveyed through descriptions that tell us about a world that is not accessible to our senses. This was B. Russell's point of view when he distinguished between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. However, as Wittgenstein pointed out, it should be added that even our sensory data are cultural and therefore cannot constitute a neutral, physiological basis for knowledge.

But in AI, data is far from being sensory, pure, or neutral. In reality, it consists of inferences, i.e., knowledge that has already been developed with biases, most often linked to interests, particularly those of the big firms that put it into service and circulation. Not only is it not "data," but it is also reasoning that is biased and presented as universal, potentially applicable to everyone, when in fact it is all derived from premises that are not always explicit.

The massification of data also reduces attention to data content. As a result, prejudices and stereotypes are sometimes conveyed without the knowledge of data users. "Despite their apparent neutrality, this data—particularly data containing physiological or psychological parameters that reveal people's identities, tastes, or health status—can be misused for the purpose of abusive surveillance of behavior. For example, by analyzing the food preferences of travelers or supermarket customers, it is possible to obtain information about consumers' personal beliefs or other elements that could be used for market research, without their knowledge, consent, or in their best interests, and therefore under ethically unjustifiable conditions."²⁾

An example: The healthcare field

There are growing calls for AI algorithms to be documented in a way that allows users to understand the steps involved in their development. However, companies have become accustomed to offering algorithms without revealing how they were built. Designers remain silent about how their algorithms work, creating tension between the need for transparency (particularly regarding the steps involved in building the algorithm) and competitive issues between manufacturers.

In the field of healthcare, how can AI be integrated into the culture of patient autonomy, which has become irreversible, a culture that grants patients the right to information about their health from healthcare professionals? Should we talk about delegating responsibility to the machine's designer or about diluting that responsibility? The WHO is considering the ability of a digital service provider to restrict the independence of its system through human action.

If AI is a set of single tasks, ethics refers to the non-specific task of "human supervision" and evaluation, which should allow for compensation in the event of decisions made on the basis of algorithms that are harmful. In particular, this involves assessing the share of responsibility that falls to the software designer and that which falls to the user.

Article 17 of the French Bioethics Law of August 2, 2021 states: "Healthcare professionals who decide to use a medical device involving algorithmic data processing based on machine learning from big data for prevention, diagnosis, or treatment purposes shall ensure that the person concerned has been informed and, where applicable, warned of the resulting interpretation."

There are concerns about security and the accumulation of personal data on individuals'

2) Jean-Pierre Dubois, « Nos droits face aux « big data » : quels enjeux, quels risques, quelles garanties ? », Association Après demain, 2016/1 N° 37, NF | pages 6 à 9.

choices, tastes, and behaviors, which gives rise to what the WHO refers to as “behavioral data surplus.” These concerns are particularly acute in the health and social protection sector, which requires a higher level of data protection due to the highly sensitive nature of the data involved.

Conversation and information

Recently, so-called conversational robots, also known as “conversational agents,” have been developed. But again, is this really conversation? Having a conversation with someone means talking with your whole body, allowing for silence, sitting or standing, using a tone that changes according to the other person's reaction, and also engaging in a degree of playfulness, to such an extent that it is often playfulness that has been used to describe conversation, as evidenced by the writings of Montaigne and Wittgenstein on the subject. Both use the metaphor of tennis to say that we send a word as we send a ball, or we wait for a ball that is sent to us, and depending on the force of the ball, depending on the direction of the ball, we return the ball in a different way each time. This metaphor also emphasizes the direction of speech, not just its content. Direction implies a specific conversation from one person to another, rather than expectations based on content.

Conversing with a human being means taking the risk of being contradicted or contradicting others. I mentioned Alice's tough world. Montaigne said that Socrates laughed at contradictions and even sought them out because he knew that they sharpened the mind. So much so that conversation is not conducted to learn new things, but to develop the ability to learn. It is not a matter of accumulating knowledge in the form of data. Plato took this lesson to heart, saying that education is about moving towards less, not more. Consider Lewis Carroll's play on words between “lessen” and “lesson.” Less is more

*(do much less, so much less, Someone says,
(I know his name, no matter)—so much less!
Well, less is more),*

said the poet Robert Browning (19th century), an expression taken up by the architect Van der Rohe, who wanted minimalism in architecture.

Allow me to share with you, on this subject, a passage from an 11th-century Arab philosopher, Abou Al hamid Al Ghazali (died on 1111, common era). His idea was to rid the heart of the rust that accumulates there; rust here meaning bad deeds. To convey this idea, he used the following story: an Arab-Muslim caliph organized a painting competition between two groups, one Chinese and one Roman. He gave them two sections of wall on which to practice their art, separated by a veil. When they finished, the caliph was surprised to see that the Chinese had not used any tools. They said that they had worked and that the veil could be removed to reveal their work. Their work consisted of polishing the wall until it resembled

a mirror in which the Romans' work was reflected. Competition became collaboration, and through their work, the Chinese magnified the work of others.

We are increasingly overwhelmed by a continuous flow of information that does not always have the status of validated knowledge, whereas we could take inspiration from the lessons of Plato and the Chinese to remove everything that clutters our minds and often comes from fake news. Since 2022, on social media, the amount of fake news has exceeded that of valid information.

The brain/machine analogy

Since the mid-1950s, our understanding of the brain itself has been dependent on the informational paradigm put forward by the founders of cybernetics. But it is one thing to talk about the brain in informational terms, and quite another to reduce all knowledge to information.

Our neurons are thought to be information-processing machines. Cybernetics, which emerged in the 1940s and 1950s and is essentially based on controlled analogies between organisms and machines, adopted this metaphor: neuronal activity is thought to be a coding activity based on the binary principle of rest or action, inhibition and excitation.

It is easy to conclude that the spatiality of neurons is like a “network” that represents informational states governed by logical operations such as conjunction (neurons together), disjunction (separate neurons), and implication (from one neuron to another).

The informational metaphor is used to describe the relationship between the brain and thought: both process information, at different levels of representation and organization. Embedded in the paradigm of information and single-tasking, the human brain has become involved in mechanical tasks, as if it functioned like a calculating machine. But it is difficult to project onto the human brain the performance of a single task, or a combination of single tasks.

What fMRI studies show is that there is not necessarily a correlation between the amount of activity revealed in the image and the physiological importance of the task being performed. Similarly, the area of the brain highlighted by fMRI does not indicate that this area is devoted to a single function.

Neuronal activity is not directly correlated with the importance of the function. The BOLD signal measured by fMRI is not a direct image of neuronal activity, nor is neuronal activity a direct image of the brain's tasks.

The BOLD (Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent) signal only measures the metabolic changes associated with neuronal activity.

Philosophers have never spoken of knowledge in terms of addiction. On the contrary, the more we know, the more we develop the means of knowing, not only in quantity but also in quality, and conversation remains the human means not only of sharing the pleasure of talking, but also of building common projects.

However, the cognitive abilities of human beings are increasingly being called into question by the use of ChatGPT. Studies, such as the one conducted by MIT researcher Nataliya Kosmyna, show that memory, attention, and planning skills are, in the long run, atrophied by the exclusive use of ChatGPT.

Add to this, the fact that digital distractions reduce our ability to concentrate and undermine our attention span. We remember less of a text written by ChatGPT than one we have written ourselves. We absorb knowledge less effectively this way. Like bees transforming marjoram into honey, humans transform what they learn into their own knowledge: the heterogeneous becomes homogeneous. This is what is called into question by ChatGPT, which tends to standardize knowledge without making it truly universal.

Ethical issues raised by AI

Questioning knowledge is therefore very different from consuming data, even when that data appears to reflect controversy in the form of "some people think that" or "others think that." Professor Raja Chatila, professor of artificial intelligence, robotics, and ethics at the Sorbonne, emphasizes that:

"The artificial intelligence system is not a moral agent in the philosophical sense of the term. It is a digital system which, and this is very important, does not understand the terms it uses. To think that AI will be competent in matters of morality is an ontological error." He adds: "Ethical deliberation is not about applying rules. It is about reflecting on a concrete situation, taking into account values that may be varied and, at times, contradictory, in order to make choices."

I will go further because it is not just a matter of deliberating and making choices. We have to prepare them. Between two actions, between two choices, there is an interval, and it is during this interval that the choice is made. This interval is very difficult to simulate in a chatbot or conversational agent. The interval between two actions requires reflection that constantly weighs up the available arguments, concrete situations, and contexts.

This is what we focus our attention on. We have a rich vocabulary when it comes to talking about will, free will, choice, and power, but a very poor vocabulary when it comes to talking about attention. However, the automatic nature of data and its massification do not allow attention to be exercised, not to mention that most of it is forgotten as soon as it is used. Ethics is not about listing principles such as respect, kindness, and tolerance. All these principles were established in response to ethical nightmares and scandals, as demonstrated by the Nuremberg Code of 1947 and various declarations by international organizations, such as the Helsinki Declaration and the Manila Declaration.

Each time, it is to put an end to reprehensible behavior. So, at the beginning, it is first the infractions, something that is wrong, that are presented to us. Humanity is built on norms, of course, but these norms come about through a process of normalization that puts an end to scandalous practices.

Furthermore, not all human situations involve problem solving. Some, as we have just seen, are not problems to be solved, but scandalous situations where facts and values are intertwined. To remedy this, the emotional, playful, and imaginative aspects of humanity prove to be fruitful.

In the field of fiction as in that of research, there is a way of dealing with unpredictability that does not depend on already available data. As Meno's paradox on research shows: if we know what we are looking for, why look for it since we already know it, and if we don't know, how will we know once we have obtained it that this is what we were looking for?

As living beings, we share with other living beings a structural ignorance about how our evolution will continue. We are evolving, of course, but how? COVID-19 has shown us that it is possible for humanity, as a living species, to face the unpredictable, which cannot be reduced to a combination of available data, and that humanity still needs models of anticipation that are not based solely on data.

Learning is not just about deduction; it is also about playfulness, as I have said many times. Lewis Carroll's famous work, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, which is entirely devoted to conversation, offers language games that revive the conversation through homophonies and homonymies, creating constant surprises.

More generally, idioms and proverbs, which are the genius of a language and the very emblem of the untranslatable, can certainly be stored in a database, but these elements themselves are constantly changing according to the speakers, as Jack Goody shows in his analysis of the Bagré myth in Ghana: people constantly modify the myth as they recite it.

There is therefore an element of unpredictability:


“Human intelligence is capable of adapting to new situations and inventing without having been specifically prepared for a particular situation. Machines, on the other hand, need to have seen a similar case before.”³⁾

3) Luc Juila, L'intelligence artificielle n'existe pas [Artificial intelligence does not exist], Institut Diderot, November 14, 2019, p.15.

Between Artificial Intelligence and Social Soul

인공지능과 사회적 영혼 사이

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Abstract

Today's AI revolution is, in large part, about the future of intelligent life and how human individuals will merge with machines in forms of nonbiological intelligence. The tradition of modern social science is, by contrast, grounded in the question of consciousness and especially that of social consciousness. This essay asks how the rising notion of posthuman intelligence can speak to the established idea of collective consciousness.

The rise of Artificial Intelligence is a noted phenomenon today. News bulletins and public conversations are abundant with updates on the increasing power of this technical form, including how it already has seeped deep into our quotidian lives and the stunning rapidity in which it is maturing. We are made to confront this phenomenon, for instance, when, while searching the Amazon, we are inundated by suggestions for further reading made by the site's algorithmic machinery. I had an occasion to stop by a district office in Seoul. A poster prominently displayed next to the counter said that AI-doctored, beautified pictures are not accepted for issuing identification cards. And we know about the exciting matches between the DeepMind-invented AlphaGo and the South Korean Go master Lee Sedol. The so-called Smart Phone is now one of the most intimate life companions for many of us, sometimes more intimate than what we learn from classical social theories—such as friends and kin. In Seoul's metro, it is not difficult to see passengers, both young and not so young, who are interacting with their individual mobile devices in an utterly engaged way. In these contexts, the device is not merely a tool for communication (with families and friends). It is also what some pundits call AI Companion, which, powered by large language models and gigantic data bases, simulates human-like conversation and companionship.

It is argued that the materiality of such non-human companions involves generative social intelligence—the power to get to know its human counterpart and to attend to the latter's desires, state of being and routine ways to relate to the world. On a broader terrain of contemporary public discourse, observers speculate how soon AI's intelligence, including its social intelligence, will surpass that of human actors and whether in this process AI will be freed from the status of an instrument, moving closer to that of an agent instead. Debates are also being waged as to the implications of this posthuman companionship—whether the last entails a progressive scientific revolution or whether, on the contrary, it has a property of duplicity, being beneficial to the human world in many ways but potentially destructive to the sustenance of this world.

Acute concerns are also expressed as to the way in which AI-related research and investment are conducted in today's world¹⁾. These concerns include those about the concentration of capital and power in a few corporate and state actors of the contemporary world. These actors consume and cumulate a colossal amount of energy and data sources, and are also engaged in a confrontational economic and geopolitical power struggle amongst. The last aspect is especially critical since it goes against the imperative of broad international agreement and solidarity that judicious observers argue is vital for containing the AI world to a positive force for the human world at large (a human-centred force, according to Europe's recent AI Act statement) as well as for the question of ecological sustainability that this world is confronting today. What all this entails is that the future of AI, just like that of the

1) Karen Hao, *Empire of AI: Dreams and Nightmares in Sam Altman's OpenAI* (New York: Penguin, 2025).

global environment, has to be grounded in a strong sense of a common world that goes beyond the parochial interests of particular national states. It also speaks of the fact that AI's sphere of intelligence must involve the learning and understanding of norms and values that today's humanity holds dear. It goes without saying that these values and norms must have coherence across places, anchored in humanistic and internationalist commitments.

Now let me briefly mull over some of the issues raised above in relation to Korea. South Korea is a highly advanced society in digital technology with some of its key corporate actors leading the advance globally. The country's political leadership is keen on promoting AI-related research development in collaboration with the established superpowers in this domain, the United States and China, as well as with several aspiring societies elsewhere in Asia. Geopolitically, Korea's historically constituted existential status is such that it is bound to interact closely with the two superpowers and continually explore ways to sustain a peaceful region. South Korea is a society that has long struggled for political democracy, against many odds, and one that is proud of its achievement in this realm. Hence, despite the precarious, enduring condition of the Cold War-induced national partition, the country is well placed to confront the AI-related public concerns mentioned earlier. This is the case in both technical and political terms. The question at stake is how to take part in the so-called AI revolution with a clear and mature commitment to the sustenance and betterment of political and social democracy. It also involves charting the path of technical advancement in such a way that the process can be conducive to freeing the world community from divisive great power politics, past and present.

Allow me to go more local now. Andong and its surrounding areas are, as some of the interventions that we will hear later clearly show, renowned as a place that preserves the moral and aesthetic integrity of Korea's traditional culture. This culture's strength is very much grounded in the virtue and practice of ancestral remembrance. These practices involve recognition of other spiritual identities and their presence in communal lives. Notable here are the spirits of the neighbourly hills and mountains whose powers are prominent not only in popular conception but also in sites such as Buddhist pagodas. The traditional Korean household had within its sphere sites for the spirit of the land, the guardian of the house, the kitchen god and other intimate beings. Beyond the individual house, there are spirit persons associated with remarkable trees, stones and water sources. People of this area long considered it to be a virtuous thing to cohabit with these otherworldly beings, ancestral and otherwise, harmoniously—a cultural form that is found widely across Asia.

The tradition of modern human and social science is intimate with such a phenomenon. In the

classical French sociological school represented by Emile Durkheim's formative intervention, for instance, these phenomena would be in close touch with what he called *Homo Duplex*.²⁾ The term refers to the condition of human existence that is constituted by, on the one hand, individual consciousness and soul and, on the other hand, what Durkheim referred to as social soul or collective consciousness. Human life evolves along an artful interplay between these two forms or layers of the soul, according to him. As well known, intimacy between the living and the dead in both normative and practical horizons is pivotal to the concept of social soul and collective consciousness. Contrary to how some contemporary observers understand this conceptual scheme, the idea of social soul is far from sociocentric or androcentric.³⁾ It can reach out to the myriad existents other than narrowly defined human legacies (i.e., ancestors)—that is, those that are distributed widely in the built and natural environment within which human lives unfold. More than anything else, the focus of this theoretical heritage has been on the question of consciousness—to the extent that in numerous cultural practices, the status of being human is nearly synonymous to nurturing the soul's social horizon—in terms of historical-genealogical depth and spatial-environmental breath. And the scope of our social soul is not necessarily restricted to our immediate environment. On the contrary, it can reach out to much wider horizons, when needed, and can incorporate even the idea of world society.

South Korea's legendary folklorist and anthropologist, Yim Seok-jay (1903-1998), was trained in the above theoretical tradition, and he left a creative legacy of his own. Yim delved into the constitutive order of diverse spirit persons existing in Korea's traditional culture. He coined the expression "parallelism," which in this context refers to the sovereign existence of these personas and an equalitarian relationality amongst them.⁴⁾ According to Yim, each spirit persona is, whether an eminent earth spirit or a humble kitchen goddess, a sovereign existent within her or his defined sphere of existence. The same applies to vital instruments of human productive activity, such as basic agrarian tools. Seen as a whole, according to him, their communal coexistence exhibits a strong norm of equality among the individual constituents. They constitute a parallelist order, something akin to an ideal modern international system anchored in the concepts of sovereignty and equality—not an imperial or feudal hierarchical system.

I will conclude my small contribution today with a reflection on the above legacy of modern

2) Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, translated by Karen E. Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995 [1912])

3) Bruno Latour, "Gabriel Tarde and the End of the Social," in Patrick Joyce (ed.) *The Social in Question: New Bearings in History and the Social Sciences* (London: Routledge), pp. 117-132.

4) Heonik Kwon and Jun-Hwan Park, *Spirit Power: Politics and Religion in Korea's American Century* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2022), pp. 136-156.

social science. The question at stake here is not intelligence such as what we hear in the discourse widely circulating today in relation to the AI technology—how to turn the digital machine to something that is as intelligent as the human being and whether this move will result in the dethroning of human supremacy in general world affairs.⁵⁾ This discourse involves, in part, a controversy over whether the AI-human relations have implications for the question of consciousness—that is, whether AI (or what is referred to as AGI) will have not only super-intelligence but also a level of consciousness increasingly approaching that of human beings. I am not able to engage with this question as I am not in possession of an adequate research background in relevant fields. What I can say is simply that in the tradition of modern human science, the focus has long been on consciousness, not intelligence, and specifically on social consciousness (with the exception of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology). From the moment of birth, according to this tradition, we mature in our duplex soul and with the growth of the social soul. The last is what ultimately makes us human, and it is about how we embrace and nurture others—both other humans and the world they dwell together—as part of our selves. These others are all sovereign entities on their own, although they can bring their strengths together for the security and integrity of their common existence. My aspiration is that this eminent research tradition will continue to mature in the time to come, helping us to confront the changing conditions of human sociality and solidarity now and in the immediate future. If these conditions involve a forceful manufacturing of non-human intelligence and related attempt to redefine the idea of consciousness, I hope that the tradition will stand firm on its humanistic understanding of human social existence and engage critically with the rising reality of mechanistic intelligence. This engagement will surely be about, in a significant part, whether the emergent concept of intelligence is compatible with our social consciousness. At the least, it will involve efforts to foreground the imperative to bring the fundamentals of our social soul to the vital integral property of AI's general intelligence.

5) Jenny Huberman, *Transhumanism: From Ancestors to Avatars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), p. 144.

AI시대의 인간: 인간과 AI의 공진화 (共進化: Co-Evolution)

Humanity in the Age of AI: Co-Evolution of Humans and AI

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초록

“AI가 세상을 빠르게 바꾸고 있다. Ray Kurzweil이 『특이점이 온다』에서 예견한대로 21세기 중반 정도가 되면 AI로 인해 인간은 기존의 인류와는 전혀 다른 초인류의 모습으로 변하게 될 것이다. AI 시대를 맞아 다양한 기계지능이 인간의 지능에 내재화될 때 인류는 이전에 경험하지 못했던 새로운 삶의 양식과 공동체의 모습을 맞이하게 될 것이다. 가치, 사고, 윤리, 삶과 죽음까지 기존의 삶의 양태와는 다른 모습으로 나타나게 될 AI로 변하는 사회에서 인간과 인간의 삶에 대한 학문인 인문학은 또 어떤 모습으로 변할 것인지에 대한 고민을 시작해야 한다.”

Abstract

AI is rapidly transforming the world. As Ray Kurzweil predicted in *The Singularity Is Near*, by the middle of the 21st century, humanity will have transformed into a superhuman species fundamentally different from what we have known, driven by the advancement of AI. As various forms of machine intelligence become internalized within human intelligence in the age of AI, humanity will encounter new ways of living and new forms of social systems, unlike anything experienced before. In a society transformed by AI, values, thought, ethics, and even life and death take on entirely new forms. We must begin contemplating how the humanities, the discipline concerned with humanity and human life, will itself transform.

AI의 시대가 다가오고 있다. 사회 곳곳에서 AI의 도래를 이야기한다. AI가 교육을 바꾸고, 생산 공정 시스템을 바꾸고, 법조계, 의료계, 금융 등 모든 분야의 사회 시스템에서 기존 시스템을 변화시키려고 한다. 마치 15세기 중반 구텐베르크가 인쇄술을 발명하여 정보 전달의 미디어가 바뀌자 인류문명사가 획기적으로 변화한 것과 유사한 또 하나의 변혁이다.

구텐베르크의 금속활자 인쇄술은 유럽사회를 천년이상 지배했던 로마 가톨릭 교회의 막강한 지배체제를 붕괴시켰다. 구전을 통해서만 정보가 전달되고 강론을 통해서만 하나님의 이야기를 들을 수 있었기에 왜곡된 정보도 일반 신도들은 그대로 받아들일 수밖에 없었다. 성경책은 라틴어로 쓰여 족고 일 년에 두 세권만 필경사들에 의해 복사되었기 때문에 일반 신도들은 성경을 읽는 것이 불가능했다. 성직자들에 의해 성경이 자의적으로 해석되었고 가톨릭교회가 마침내 면죄부까지 판매하게 되어 마틴 루터가 95개 조항의 비판을 담은 종교개혁 선언문을 발표하게 된 것이다.

만약 인쇄술이 없었다면 작은 파동에 불과했을 종교개혁 선언이 인쇄술의 도움으로 6개월 만에 유럽 전역에 약 30만 부가 복사되어 배포되었다고 한다. 마틴 루터의 95개조 종교개혁 선언문이 인쇄물에 의해 손쉽게 확산되자 독일뿐 아니라 스위스 등 전 유럽에서 종교개혁 운동은 확산되었다. 이를 계기로 유럽에서 중세 암흑시대가 끝날 수 있었다.

이후 루터는 라틴어 성경을 독일어로 번역해서 성경을 인쇄하여 배포했다. 이를 통해 일반신도들이 하나님의 이야기를 새롭게 깨우칠 수 있게 되었다. 인류가 중세시대에 신분주의를 바탕으로 살아오던 모든 삶의 양식이 인본주의 삶으로 크게 바뀌는 계기가 된 것이다. 인쇄술의 발명이라는 작은 나비의 날갯짓은 중세시대의 종교개혁의 확산뿐 아니라 정치사회 시스템을 획기적으로 바꾸는 계기가 되어, 르네상스, 과학혁명, 인권사상, 산업혁명 등 인류문명사에 엄청난 변화를 일으키게 되었다.

이제 AI는 중세 인쇄술의 발명 못지않은 또 하나의 커다란 변화를 인류문명에 끼치게 될 것이다. AI가 기존의 사회시스템에서 인간 지성이 기여하던 부분을 대체할 수 있게 되었기 때문이다. 특히 20세기 대량생산체제에서 좁은 부분의 전문성을 갖고 이를 조립하여 효율적으로 일을 하던 인류는 많은 단순 반복적 전문화된 일을 AI에게 맡겨서 처리할 수 있게 되었다. 누구나 지식을 손쉽게 획득하고 활용할 수 있게 되어 기존 생산 시스템에 획기적인 변혁이 일어나게 될 것이다.

2024년 노벨 물리학상과 화학상은 모두 AI 연구자가 수상했다. 노벨 화학상을 수상한 데미스 허사비스(Demis Hasabis)는 영국의 수학 천재로 2016년 이세돌을 4대 1로 완패시킨 AI 알파고를 만든 장본인이다. 인류가 그 동안 발견한 단백질 구조는 약 19만 개로 유럽 바이오인포매틱스 연구소(European Bioinformatics Institute)에 저장되어 있다. 그런데 노벨 화학상을 받은 허사비스는 알파폴드 AI를 만들어 이를 활용하여 지구상에 존재한다는 2억 개의 단백질 구조를 98% 이상의 확률로 밝혀냈다. 이제 이를 통해 신약개발 등 다양한 생화학 연구가 새로운 길을 걷게 될 것이다.

2015년 타임지 표지는 그 해 태어난 아이가 얼마까지 생존할 수 있을까 하는 질문에 142세까지 살 수 있을 것이라는 답을 내놓았다. 인간이 수천 년간 삼십년을 한 세대라고 하여 두 세대 정도 살던 생명주기가 이제 다섯 세대까지 살 수 있는 생명주기로 바뀔 수 있다는 것이다. 이미 우리나라의 평균수명도 1950년대에

는 53세 정도에 불과했는데 이제는 여성 87세, 남성 80세로 한 세대를 더 살게 되었다. 더 나아가 2017년에 세계보건기구 WHO와 영국의 Imperial College of London이 공동으로 2030년의 전 세계 주요국가의 수명 기대치를 조사한 결과를 보면 한국의 평균수명이 90세를 넘어 세계에서 평균수명 1위 국가가 될 것이라는 전망을 보여주고 있다. 이제 인간의 지성을 넘어 AI의 지성이 공진화하게 될 때 생명연장에 대한 연구는 더욱 활발하게 나타나 인간의 생명은 이전과는 다른 비약적인 변화를 겪게 될 것이다.

2005년 『특이점이 온다』를 출간하여 미래사회를 예견한 구글의 이사 레이 커즈와일은 2045년 특이점이 나타나게 되면 인간은 AI의 도움을 받아 영생할 수 있을지도 모른다고 하며 『영원히 사는 법』이라는 책도 출판했다. 2022년 ChatGPT의 등장으로 가속화된 범용 AI의 위력은 인류가 이제 본격적으로 AI시대를 맞게 되었다는 것을 실감하게 만들었다. 이런 빠른 AI의 발전으로 커즈와일은 2024년 『마침내 특이점이 시작된다』라는 책을 출간하여 AI가 2029년 정도에는 인간의 지성을 뛰어넘는 능력을 보이게 될 것이라고 전망하고 있다.

이처럼 인간의 지적 능력을 뛰어넘는 AI의 지성이 인간의 지성과 공진화하게 되면 인류사회는 이전과는 전혀 다른 발전을 보이게 될 것이다. 레이 커즈와일은 AI의 도움으로 의학혁명이 일어나 인류의 수명이 획기적으로 바뀔 수 있다고 믿고 있다. 의학혁명이 일어날 때까지 살아남기 위해서는 9가지 방법이 필요하다고 제시하면서 커즈와일은 자신도 그때까지 살아남기 위해서 일 년에 십억 원이 넘는 비용을 지불하여 하루에 건강보조식품을 200정 이상 먹는다고 한다.

캐나다 토론토 대학은 AI연구가 추운 겨울을 맞았을 때 캐나다 정부로부터 예외적으로 연구기금을 지속적으로 지원받아 이제 AI연구가 본격화되자 전 세계 AI연구의 메카처럼 인식되고 있다. 2024년 노벨 물리학상을 수상한 제프리 힌튼도 토론토 대학교수이다.

최근 캐나다 정부는 토론토대학에 2억 달러 정도의 연구기금을 지원했다. 이는 AI가 실험실에서 사람이 없어도 자동적으로 연구를 할 수 있는 다양한 AI기반 실험실을 구축하려는 시도이다. 기업과 재단으로부터도 연구기금이 지원되어 AI를 활용한 자동실험실에서는 로봇, 신 물질, 의약 등 여러 분야의 R&D가 수행될 것으로 전망된다. 연구자가 실험실에 없어도 자동으로 과학적 실험이 가능하도록 설계된 AI자동화 실험실에서는 24시간 다양한 과학연구를 수행할 수 있다. 대표적으로 신소재, 의약품, 청정에너지, 제조업 고도화 등을 연구한다. 기존 실험실에서 실험을 할 경우 소요되던 R&D 비용이나 시간을 획기적으로 줄이면서 고도의 연구가 가능해지게 된다.

캐나다 몬트리올 은행은 AI기반금융실험실(AI-assisted Financial Lab)을 구축하기 위해서 토론토대학에 500만 달러를 기부했다. 세계 최대 자산운용사 중 하나인 Vanguard도 2025년 5월에 AI와 머신러닝 기술을 활용한 금융 및 과학 실험연구를 위해 토론토 대학에 연구 기금을 투자했다. 이제 과학실험실에서도 자동화 공장처럼 사람 없이도 실험이 가능한 시대가 다가오고 있기에 효율적 연구를 가속화하는 기반을 구축하기 위해 다양한 기관에서 기부를 하고 있는 것이다. 이렇게 되면 오랜 시간 연구자들이 실험실에서 실험을 반복적으로 하기 위해 시간을 보내기 보다는 새로운 아이디어를 어떻게 만들어내는가 하는 것에 더욱 많은 시간을 보내야 할 것이다. 이런 AI의 활용은 새로운 발명과 발견을 가속화시켜 상상하지 못할 정도의 빠른 속도로 인류의 삶을 바꿀 수 있다.

2023년에 일본에서 출간된 히라노 게이치로(平野啓一郎)의 소설 『본심(本心)』은 2040년을 배경으로 한 장편 SF소설이다. 주인공 이시카와 사쿠야는 요양원에 있는 노인들과 같이 거동이 불편한 사람들을 위해 그들이 가보고 싶어 하는 장소를 찾아가 자신이 장착한 카메라가 달린 고글로 의뢰인들에게 영상을 전달한다. 그러면 의뢰인이 헤드 셋을 쓰고 마치 현장에 있는 것처럼 현장의 광경을 체험하게 하는 리얼 아바타의 일을 주인공은 아르바이트로 수행하면서 생계를 유지하고 있다. 스스로 죽음을 택하겠다고 자유사를 주장하던 어머니가 69세의 나이에 사고사로 사망하게 되자, 주인공은 어머니를 간절히 그리워하는 마음으로 어머니의 생명보험금을 갖고 300만 엔을 지불하고 어머니의 가상인물인 버추얼 피규어(Virtual Figure) 제작을 의뢰한다. 버추얼 피규어 제작회사는 사쿠야 어머니의 생전 사진과 비디오, 그리고 아들과 주고받은 문자메시지, 이메일 등 자료를 제공받아 이를 AI에 학습시키고 증강기술을 활용하여 어머니와 똑같은 모습의 버추얼 피규어를 제작해준다. 제작을 의뢰하기 전 상담하는 과정에서 이 회사의 사장이 나카오라는 모델을 데리고 버추얼 피규어에 대해 자세한 설명을 해준다.

사장과 함께 사이버 공간에 나타난 이 모델은 부인과 딸을 남겨두고 4년 전 강에서 사고로 익사한 가장이다. 딸의 요청으로 버추얼 피규어가 된 나카오는 사이버 공간에서 사쿠야에게 인사하면서 자신을 소개한다. 주름진 얼굴에 눈물을 글썽이고 표정 하나 하나가 살아있는 사람과 구별이 불가능할 정도로 자연스러운 모습을 보여준다. 자신을 설명하면서 사실은 자신의 사망으로 가족들의 경제상황이 어렵게 되어서 자신이 모델 활동을 하면서 회사로부터 버는 돈은 부인과 딸에게 지불된다고 한다. 죽은 사람이 산 사람을 위해 돈을 벌어주는 일이 벌어지고 있는 것이다.

더 나아가 회사의 사장은 매달 일정한 비용을 지불하면 사쿠야의 어머니에게 매일 매일 일어나는 뉴스나 T.V. 연속극을 학습시켜 사쿠야가 집에 돌아와 버추얼 피규어 어머니와 대화를 할 때 일상 대화가 마치 어머니가 살아있는 것처럼 똑같이 가능하게 해주겠다고 제안한다. AI의 발전으로 우리는 현실과 가상의 구별이 안 되는 사회에 살 수 있고, 삶과 죽음의 경계까지도 모호해지는 미래를 살지 모른다.

젊은이들은 매일의 일상을 SNS에 올려 다른 사람들에게 보여준다. 이전에는 자신의 하루 생활을 적은 일기는 자신만의 비밀스러운 일기장에만 간직하고 어느 누구도 보는 것이 허락되지 않았다. 그러나 이제는 자신의 일상을 자랑스럽게 보여주고 있다. 하지만 이 일상의 모습은 보여주고 싶은 자신의 일상이지 보여주지 싶은 일상은 감춘다. 인스타그램과 같은 공개영상을 통해 보여 지는 자아와 실제 자아는 매우 다를 수 있어서, 인간의 다중인격적 모습이 더욱 강화되는 미래를 우리는 맞이할 수 있다.

이런 일련의 사례를 통해 우리는 인간이 AI와 공진화하면서 인류문명이 발전해나가는 동시에 이전 시대의 인간과는 매우 다른 인간의 모습으로 우리가 진화하게 될 것을 예상할 수 있다. 이제 AI의 발전과 함께 인간 본연의 모습, 그리고 AI에 의해 영향을 받아 새롭게 변하게 되는 인간의 모습에 대해서도 더 많은 연구가 필요하게 된다.

인문학은 인간에 대해 연구하는 학문이다. 서동욱 교수 등이 『싸우는 인문학』에서 주장하는 것과 같이 인문학은 변하는 시대 속에서 인간의 참 모습을 이해하기 위한 학문으로 자리매김해야 한다. 한 동안 인문학을 애플의 스티브 잡스처럼 제품을 인간에 더 쉽게 다가가기 위해 만드는 도구로서 활용하려고 했지만 이제는 인간의 본연의 모습을 보다 심도 있게 연구해야 하고, AI나 사이버 공간으로 인해 달라지는 인간의 모습에 대

해 연구해야 한다. 기존의 기능적인 인간의 활동은 아주 많은 부분이 AI에 의해 대체될 것이다. 그러면 인간은 어떤 일들을 하고, 어떤 사회적 시스템을 구축하고, 어떤 삶의 방식을 영위해나갈 것인지에 대해 우리는 고민하고 연구해야 한다. AI가 바뀌어나가는 인류문명사에서 인간 지성이 어떤 역할을 하게 될지가 매우 중요한 시대적 과제이자 학문적 과제로 다가오고 있다.

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Director, Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics



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한국정신문화의 수도

"조선인재朝鮮人才, 반재영남半在嶺南. 영남인재嶺南人才, 반재일선半在一善."
조선 중기 이후, 영남인재嶺南人才, 반재안동半在安東.

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다시 북주福州가 되었다가
공민왕 때 다시 안동대도호부가 되다.
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고구려 굴화군-屈火郡,
다시 신라 고녕군古寧郡 고창군古昌郡이다가
왕건에 의해서 안동이라는 이름을 받음.
다시 영가永嘉가 되었다가
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밀암密菴 이재 李栽 1657-1730

난줄재 懶拙齋 이산두李山斗 1680-1772

대산大山 이상정李象靖 1711-1781

소산小山 이광정李光靖 1714-1789

정재定齋 유치명 柳致明 1777-1861

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석주石洲 이상룡李象龍1858-1932

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석하石霞 김종길金宗吉1926-2017

* 해방이후에도 많은 인물이 배출 되었다.
역사적 평가를 하기는 이르다.

심포지엄 1
Symposium

AI 거버넌스

박태웅 | Taewoong Park

AI의 시대, 도전과 응전

The Age of AI, Challenge and Response

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KEYNOTE SPEECH
SPECIAL LECTURE

SYMPOSIUM 1

SYMPOSIUM 2

SYMPOSIUM 3


SYMPOSIUM 4

AI의 시대, 도전과 응전

The Age of AI, Challenge and Response

박태웅
녹서포럼 의장

Taewoong Park
Chairman, Green Paper Forum



Abstract

미디어는 메시지다. 모든 미디어는 나타날 때 대단히 뚜렷하고 구체적인 변화의 방향을 지시한다. 마치 메스미디어가 메스의 탄생을 부른 것처럼. 증기기관이 공장을 강의 곁에서 해방한 것처럼, 전기가 인류를 밤에서 해방한 것처럼.

AI는 운영체제가 됐다. 인류사상 최초로 사용하는 도구가 아닌, 함께 하는 파트너로서의 도구가 됐다. 그리고 AGI가 온다. 3대 AI를 만든 샘 알트만, 데미스 하사비스, 다리오 아모데이 그리고 딥러닝의 대부 제프리 힌턴까지 모두 AGI가 2030년 안팎에 온다고 한다. 샘 알트만의 진술에 따르면 AGI가 도래하면 적어도 일에 관련한 사람은 필요없다.

2026년부터는 AI가 스스로를 개선하는 경향이 뚜렷이 나타나게 된다. 클라우드 코드의 경우 이미 전체 코드의 80%를 스스로 짜고 있다. 인류는 운전대를 놓치고 있다. 왜 좋아지는지, 어디로 가고 있는지를 알기가 어렵게 된다.

웨어러블 디바이스의 도래는 필연이다. 맥락을 공유하는데 이보다 더 좋은 수단이 없기 때문이다. 그 편리함과 함께 인류는 생각을 잃어버리게 된다.

빈부격차, 계급격차가 두드러지고, 일자리가 줄어들고, 소수의 슈퍼엘리트들이 AI의 방향을 결정하는 경향을 피할 수 없다. 인류는 어떻게 AI시대를 대비해야 하는가.

Abstract

The medium is the message. Every medium, when it emerges, indicates a remarkably clear and concrete direction of change. Just as mass media gave birth to the masses, just as the steam engine liberated factories from riversides, just as electricity liberated humanity from the night.

AI has become an operating system. For the first time in human history, it has become not a tool we use, but a tool as partner—one we work alongside. And AGI is coming. Sam Altman, Demis Hassabis, and Dario Amodei—creators of the three major AIs—along with Geoffrey Hinton, the godfather of deep learning, all say AGI will arrive around 2030. According to Sam Altman, when AGI arrives, humans will no longer be needed, at least when it comes to work. From 2026 onward, AI will clearly demonstrate a tendency to improve itself. In the case of Claude Code, it already writes 80% of its entire codebase on its own. Humanity is losing its grip on the steering wheel. It becomes difficult to understand why it's improving or where it's headed.

The arrival of wearable devices is inevitable. There is no better means of sharing context. Along with that convenience, humanity will lose the ability to think.

Wealth disparities and class divisions will become pronounced, jobs will diminish, and the tendency for a small number of super-elites to determine AI's direction will be unavoidable. How should humanity prepare for the age of AI?



“미디어는 메시지다”

- 마셜 맥루한

- 매스미디어와 '매스'
- 라디오와 TV
- 스마트폰

2025 트렌드


- AI as OS
- Contextual Interface
- AI as a partner
- Agents
- Cheaper, faster, smaller
- AGI

cf 2026 트렌드

스스로 개선하는 AI ; 클로드 코드의 80%는 클로드가 짠 것
 학습에서 체험으로 ; '생각하는 로봇' 제미니 로보틱스 프로젝트
 웨어러블 디바이스 ; 맥락의 공유를 통한 완벽한 비서
 일자리의 소멸 ; 신입이 갈 곳이 없다
 AI과학자 ; 전혀 새로운 가설, 새로운 실험 설계 / 최고질문책임자
 에너지 전쟁 ; 재생에너지 + 화석에너지
 NPU 경쟁 ; 퓨리오사, 리벨리온, 중국의 GPU와 HBM
 에이전트 ; 선제성(Proactivity), 자율적으로 과업을 완수

AGI, PREDICTED TIMELINES


AGI Timeline



@slow_developer


자동화가 증강을 추월하다

Anthropic Economic Index
2025.9월



AI가 전문가와 맞먹다

- 실제 경제적 가치가 있는 업무를 얼마나 잘 수행하는가
- 미국 GDP에 큰 기여를 하는 9개 산업에서, 경제적 중요성이 큰 지식 기반 직업 5개씩, 총 44개 직업 선정, 인간 전문가와 경쟁



데이터가 없어요!



청년 일자리가 급감하다

하버드대 조사




Figure 3: Employment Differences Between Adopters and Non-Adopters Over Time
 Notes: The graph present the estimated coefficients β_j from Equation 1, ran separately to juniors and seniors. Standard errors are clustered in firm level.

“미성년자와 성적 대화를 해도 좋아”

Meta faces backlash over AI policy that lets bots have 'sensual' conversations with children

US senator Josh Hawley opened investigation into the tech giant, which said it had removed the policy guidelines



GROK4, 일론 머스크를 대변하다

How Elon Musk Is Remaking Grok in His Image

Mr. Musk said he wanted xAI's chatbot to be "politically neutral." His actions say otherwise.

Share full article

The woke mind virus "is often exaggerated"



The woke mind virus "poses significant risks"

Call for international red lines

We urgently call for international red lines prevent unacceptable AI risks.

Launched during the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly, this call has broad support from prominent leaders in policy, academia, and industry.

300+ prominent figures | 9 former heads of state and ministers | 90+ organizations | 10 Nobel laureates and recipients

“감당할 수 없는 위험을 막기 위해 각국정부는 명확하고 검증가능한 레드라인(절대로 넘지 말아야할 선)에 대한 국제적 협약을 2026년말까지 체결할 것을 강력히 촉구합니다.”



미 공화당, '주정부 독자적인 AI 규제 정책 10년 금지 법안 발의'

미 공화당, '지방 정부 AI 규제 10년 금지' 법안 끼워 넣기 논란


요약
박찬 기자



• “마틴 포드:인공지능의 잠재적 위험에 대해 여쭙 보겠습니다. 인공지능이 새로운 산업혁명을 가져오고 고용시장을 완전히 바꿀 수 있다고 생각하나요?”

• 제프리 힌튼 : 생산성을 획기적으로 높이고 더 많은 상품을 만들 수 있다면 좋은 일이 될 것입니다.

인공지능이 좋은 것인지 아닌지는 기술이 아니라 전적으로 사회체계에 달려있습니다. 사람들은 기술의 발전이 문제인 것처럼 보고 있지만 문제는 바로 사회 체계입니다. 우리가 서로 공유하는 사회 체계를 가지느냐 아니면 1%를 위해 나머지 사람들을 거름 취급하느냐는 기술과는 아무런 상관이 없습니다.



감사합니다

THE 8th WORLD HUMANITIES FORUM
제8회 세계인문학포럼

심포지엄 2 Symposium 2

중동 지역의 공존

Ahmed Nassim Barqawi | 아메드 나심 바르카위

부정적 요인과 긍정적 요인의 공존

Coexistence Between Negative and Positive Factors

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중동지역에서의 갈등과 공존 : 역사적 과정과 현실적 평화의 문화를 위해

Conflict and Coexistence in the Middle East: For a Culture of Peace

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Coexistence Between Negative and Positive Factors

부정적 요인과 긍정적 요인의 공존

아메드 나심 바르카위
푸자이라 철학의 집 학장

Ahmed Nassim Barqawi
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Abstract

Human nature, as described by Thomas Hobbes, contains a “wolfish” element that renders peaceful coexistence impossible without constraints. To rein in this violent impulse, societies have developed shared moral values such as love, cooperation, honesty, and respect for life—values reinforced by philosophy, religion, and law.

Yet humanity has not fully overcome its inner wolf. Civil, national, and ideological wars persist. Modern power structures, driven by domination and self-interest, continue to reproduce these patterns. Since the sixteenth century, Europe justified its colonial expansion through the discourse of white supremacy, dividing humanity into masters and slaves. This legacy has entrenched enduring cultural and political hierarchies.

The idea of a “clash of civilizations,” promoted by Samuel P. Huntington, reflects ongoing Western hegemony. However, genuine conflicts do not arise from cultural differences but from struggles over power, wealth, and control. The alignment of cultural identity with military alliances such as NATO exposes this dynamic even further.

Reason must resist accepting evil as inevitable. Ideologies and religions, despite their humanistic potential, have often been weaponized to undermine shared values. Drawing on Averroes (Ibn Rushd), one can affirm that truth does not contradict truth; conflicts emerge when groups absolutize their own “truth” and deny that of others.

Sustainable coexistence requires legal and political frameworks—democratic states, tolerance, and a vibrant civil society—to legitimize difference. While modernity brought an end to religious wars, violence continued in more destructive forms.

A critical reexamination of historical narratives is needed to overcome “historical hatred,” that inherited desire for vengeance which perpetuates division. History is not merely a record of conflict; it also offers examples of reconciliation, as seen in postwar relations between Vietnam and the United States of America.

Ultimately, coexistence depends on transcending ideological and historical barriers, cultivating shared human values, and establishing respect for difference.

Would you like me to adapt this translation to a more literary tone (suitable for publication) or keep it academic and philosophical as it is here?

To establish a discourse on coexistence and to uncover its negative and positive factors, we must first understand the world as it is today.

So, what is the world now?

The concept that best expresses the reality of our world today is **globalization**.

Globalization, in essence, represents the multiple transformations of capitalism. It was once believed that imperialism marked the highest stage of capitalism; yet globalization has now become its new peak. Indeed—today it is. But we cannot foresee how the transformations of history will unfold, especially as science, in its constant evolution, has become the principal force behind the cognitive unity of the world—without, however, eliminating disparities among nations and peoples.

If, as Hobbes said, *man is a wolf to his fellow man*, then living among humans would be impossible without restraining the wolfishness within them—wolfishness that manifests in countless forms of violence.

For this reason, and to make peace possible among people, humanity devised a set of shared values that, over time, became a system of norms to be upheld.

Values such as love, altruism, compassion, peace, security, cooperation, honesty, loyalty—and the condemnation of lying, deceit, murder, and all forms of harm—were all created to curb this inner wolf.

Sages, philosophers, and prophets—since before the birth of Christ—participated in shaping these values, some of which were later codified into laws that govern conduct.

Yet humanity has never been cured of its wolfishness and its many manifestations. Wars—civil or international—have persisted from the dawn of societies until now. The struggles for wealth have not ceased, and to them were added the conflicts born of mutually exclusive beliefs and ideologies.

Indeed, **power, interest, and the urge for domination and control** remain the clearest expressions of human wolfishness—whether embodied in state policies, violent groups, or tyrannical regimes.

Since Europe transformed into global nations, the entire world has become an arena for exercising its most defining traits: **control, domination, exploitation, and expansion**.

Europe, beginning in the sixteenth century, began forming its self-awareness—and its awareness of the non-European “Other”—upon the principle of white superiority and the division of humanity into master and slave.

This sense of superiority expressed itself through war, colonization, imperialism, culture, science, and ideology.

The “Other” was transformed into a mere object—something to be shaped, studied, and classified.

Naturally, the “object” exists in opposition to the “subject,” but within an almost total separation. The European subject stood face-to-face with the Asian, the African, and the Native American—seeing in them worlds of resources, markets, slaves, and inferior beings.

And though the beasts of the jungle differ, they differ only over the prey they devour—and the prey, in the end, were humans and their cultures. They found themselves in the claws of the soldier, the administrator, the orientalist, the anthropologist, the journalist, the merchant, the traveler, the industrialist, and sometimes even the philosopher.

For four centuries, the European drew the image of the “Other” as he pleased, in every color of his choosing.

The nineteenth century inaugurated the age of direct colonialism, completing the earlier age of geographical discovery. The European colonizer set foot on lands not his own, encountered peoples of yellow, black, red, and brown skin, and established his eternal residence.

The Englishman occupied Aden, preparing for a permanent presence in a strategic location fit for controlling the seas and trade routes.

From the very first moment the armed sailor stepped into those warm waters, he decreed the existence of two worlds that must never meet:

*A world in Aden—of cannons, military uniforms, administrators, doctors, European houses, and the English language;
And a Yemeni world—different, to be tamed in the most literal sense of the word.*

From the very beginning, an image was drawn for him—an image that time would never erase.

And no colonizer’s practice differed from that of the English in Aden: **colonialism entrenched racial and cultural separation**, for indeed cultural division was built upon racial division.

The colonizer turned the image of the colonized into a general archetype passed down through generations in London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, and Madrid. The European thus inherited a preconceived image of the non-European world, holding onto it so stubbornly that he refused to accept any change in time or circumstance that might contradict it.

The ideology of superiority prevents the European from relinquishing his view of the “Other” as inferior.

And the end of direct colonialism did not end this European consciousness of superiority—on the contrary, **cultural separation was reinforced** through the opposition of two civilizations: his own, and that of the entire rest of the world.

Even today, in the face of the concept of coexistence, Huntington presents us with the Clash of Civilizations.

And what is this notion, if not an ideology of domination, power, and the defense of Western interests?

When Samuel Huntington urged the West to abandon the illusion of universality and instead defend its power and cultural unity, he was not calling for the liberation of European culture from the illusion of universality, nor for equality among the world’s cultures in their free development. He was urging the West to unite against the non-European world.

He wrote clearly:

“The West went through a European phase of development and expansion lasting several centuries, and through an American phase dominating this century. If North America and Europe renew their moral and spiritual life by building a solid edifice of cultural partnership and developing closer forms of economic and political integration to complement their cooperation in NATO, they can inaugurate a third Euro-American phase of Western prosperity and political influence.”

The link between **culture** and **NATO** is among the strangest of all links—between two utterly different realms:

culture, as a form of human existence manifested through consciousness, customs, and traditions;

and NATO, as a military alliance designed to control the world.

In truth, the local and global conflicts humanity has witnessed—and will surely continue to witness—have nothing to do with a “clash of cultures,” but with **power, wealth, influence, and sovereignty**. These are the true causes of conflict.

Philosophy, by uncovering the foundations of historical conflict, liberates culture from being a mere tool for justifying such struggles.

To surrender to the persistence of evil in all its forms grants it the power to corrupt human and social life. One need not look far for examples of evil in our world, past or present. Indeed, reflecting on the state of our contemporary world—East and West, North and South—evokes both awe and dismay.

Our Arab East is drowning in the misery of sectarian conflict. Rarely can one find a place untouched by ideological, religious, or ethnic violence. And our Arab East still faces the Zionist entity, established through British colonialism, which occupied Palestine.

To surrender to such evil, as mentioned, is unworthy of human reason. Therefore, reason continues to struggle to uncover the shared human ground, the universal values, to defend them, and to strive to make them a way of life for humanity.

Even though great humanistic goals are slow to materialize and difficult to achieve, this should not produce pessimism among intellectuals and social actors. On the contrary, it must strengthen the **good will** that resists despair and defeatism.

Yet a pressing question remains:

How did ideologies—products of the mind—become the very foundation for destroying shared human values?

And likewise, how did religion—laden with benevolent values—become a source of conflict among its followers?

The rational answer is clear: **the struggle for wealth and the thirst for domination** stand behind all this evil.

But this answer alone tells us little about the discourse that sustains such evil, for **the rhetoric of killing is more dangerous than killing itself.**

The Arab philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes) was keen not to see the struggle as one between two truths, precisely because he acknowledged both. He summed this up in a profound statement:

“Truth does not contradict truth.”

If truth does not contradict truth, then how does contradiction arise between one truth and another?

Since truth is an awareness of reality, and since awareness of reality takes multiple forms, **every truth carries within it the seed of its distinction**—meaning that people differ in their understanding of truth.

Difference turns into contradiction only when each holder of a truth clings fanatically to it and denies the other’s share in truth.

As if Ibn Rushd wished to say: truth must not oppose truth, even if reality often appears otherwise.

If humans share truth both as possession and as awareness, then the coexistence of truths can only be achieved through **recognition of the other**, acknowledging the forms of truth they embody—whether the “other” is an individual, a community, or a nation.

To recognize another’s right to truth does not mean adopting their truth; it means living with them without denying their right to it.

Such coexistence cannot be achieved through mere moral preaching, however noble—it requires a **practical force** that organizes and legitimizes the right to difference.

Here arises the role of the **state**—the state of democracy, freedom, tolerance, and civil society institutions.

The religious and sectarian wars witnessed by both East and West ended with the triumph of modernity—founded on the centrality of reason and humanity.

Yet this did not end wars among humans. In fact, the wars of modern and postmodern times have surpassed any religious wars in their crimes and destructive effects.

This means that the wolfishness we spoke of earlier still operates within nations and groups. There is an urgent need to rid societies and states of **historical hatred**—that is, letting awareness of past enmities control the present and shape relations among communities and nations that once clashed.

The most dangerous offspring of historical hatred is the feeling of historical revenge—the desire to avenge the present in the name of the past—and the inheritance of narratives that perpetuate hatred and vengeance across generations.

Overcoming this requires the **courage of mutual self-criticism**—of oneself and of the other alike.

Hence emerges the importance of establishing a historical discourse that transcends false consciousness—a discourse that formulates the shared human ground in a way that fosters

a deeply humanistic inclination toward coexistence, free from any rhetoric that justifies violence, domination, or war.

History, for all its tragedies, also holds countless examples of humanity’s efforts to achieve peaceful coexistence.

And the global intellectual elite, drawing inspiration from both ancient and modern experiences of coexistence and hostility, must advance the **reason of transcendence**—a reason that overcomes everything that hinders shared living and coexistence among the different.

중동지역에서의 갈등과 공존 : 역사적 과정과 현실적 평화의 문화를 위해

Conflict and Coexistence in the Middle East: For a Culture of Peace

이희수
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초록

“매번 매순간 유대인들은 샬롬 알레이헴(שלום עליכם Shalom Aleichem), 아랍인들은 앓살라무 알라이쿰(مُأَسَّلَامًا As-salāmu ‘alaykum) 이라고 인사한다. ‘그대에게 평화가 있기를..’이라는 뜻이다. 이슬람(الإسلام)이란 언어적 의미도 ‘평화’이고 예루살렘의 의미는 ‘평화의 터전’이다. 중동은 이처럼 평화가 넘치고 평화가 충만한 세상을 노래하고 꿈꾸는 곳이다”

중동은 이슬람 이전 시기부터 인류가 최초의 문명을 일궈낸 땅이고, 다양한 이념이 함께하는 경험을 오랜 역사를 통해 축적한 공존의 현장이었다. 그래서 일찍이 미국의 중동 인류학자 칼톤 쿤(Carleton S. Coon, 1904~1981)은 중동 사회를 ‘모자이크’ 사회로 표현하면서, 민족 집단 간 뚜렷한 노동과 직업의 분화, 다양한 복장과 언어, 종교에 대한 관용 등으로 갈등과 반목보다는 이질적인 문화를 그대로 받아들여 ‘불편한 동거’에 익숙한 사회라고 정의했다. 한 걸음 더 나아가 전통적인 무슬림 사회학자들은 ‘용광로’ 이론을 주창하면서, 다양한 문화적 요소가 이슬람이라는 용광로 속에서 용해되어 피아의 구분 없는 종합적인 문화 토양으로서 중동-아랍을 규정한다.

오랜 협력과 조화의 보이지 않는 약속은 20세기가 시작되면서 서구 강대국의 경제적 야욕과 종교와 문명의 이름으로 남의 가치를 무참히 짓밟는 비종교적-반문명적 야만에 의해 산산이 깨져 버렸다. 종교, 민족, 종파 그리고 국가 간에 끊임없는 분쟁과 갈등, 테러와 전쟁이 중동을 전혀 다른 모습으로 바꾸었다. 근대화 과정에서 서구와의 접촉으로 얻을 수 있었던 것은 착취와 부도덕뿐이었다는 무슬림의 과거 역사에 대한 뼈저린 경험은 다른 저항 수단을 잃어버린 이슬람 급진 세력의 극단적인 투쟁을 불러오기도 했다. 그러나 오랜 역사를 통해 중동에서 종교 간 관계는 대립보다는 협력적이었다는 표현이 더 적절하다. 중동 근대사를 면밀히 검토해 보더라도 갈릴리 호수와 요르단강이라는 제한된 생태계를 공유하면서 토착 유대인과 아랍인이 1,900년 가까이 분쟁과 큰 갈등 없이 공존해 온 사실을 발견할 수 있다. 지구상에서 이질적인 두 민족 집단이 그토록 오랫동안 서로 양보하고 제한된 자원을 나누면서 평화롭게 공존한 역사를 쉽게 찾을 수 없을 정도다. 따라서 19세기말부터 시작된 유대인들의 대거 이주, 20세기 중반 이후 최근 70여 년간, 이스라엘 건국(1948) 이후에 격화된 아랍-이스라엘 갈등은 종교적 문제라기 보다는 영토적 이슈, 생존권 투쟁, 독립과 자치라는 자주권 요구의 성격이 훨씬 강하다. 따라서 종교 간 소통을 통해 ‘평화의 문화’를 심는 작업은 충분히 가능하고 나아가 의미 있는 시작이 될 것이다.

세계적인 지휘자인 이스라엘의 다니엘 바렌보임은 팔레스타인 젊은이들을 중심으로 여러 국가의 무슬림 음악가들과 함께 평화의 오케스트라를 결성했고, 이스라엘 영화감독 에란 리클리스는 영화를 통해 이스라엘과 팔레스타인 분쟁이나 두 민족간의 갈등이나 사랑을 예술적으로 풀어내면서 평화와 공존에 기여했다는 평가를 받고 있다. 이스라엘의 양심으로 불렸던 작가 아모스 오즈도 대표적인 평화 운동 시민단체로 348명의 이스라엘 예비역 군인들이 창립한 ‘피스 나우(Peace Now)’ 활동에 적극적으로 참여하면서 이스라엘의 폭력성에 비판을 가하면서 팔레스타인 문제의 평화적 해결을 위한 활동에 앞장섰다. 이스라엘-팔레스타인 분쟁 지역 내의 풀뿌리 평화 구축 활동을 하는 비정부기구(NGO)인 ‘중동평화를 위한 동맹(ALLMEP :Alliance for Middle East Peace)’의 평화구축 활동도 눈여겨 볼만하다. 이런 노력들이 국제사회와의 연대를 통해 중동에서의 공존을 꿈꾸는 인류사회의 희망이다.

Abstract

The Middle East is the land where humanity first cultivated civilization, even before the Islamic era, and it has historically been a site of coexistence, accumulating long experience in diverse ideologies coexisting. Thus, the American Middle East anthropologist Carleton S. Coon (1904–1981) early on described Middle Eastern society as a ‘mosaic’ society. He defined it as a society accustomed to ‘uncomfortable coexistence,’ one that embraces heterogeneous cultures rather than conflict and antagonism, due to the clear division of labor and occupation among ethnic groups, a variety of clothing, languages, and religious tolerance. Taking this a step further, traditional Muslim sociologists advocated the ‘melting pot’ theory, defining the Middle East-Arab region as a comprehensive cultural foundation where diverse cultural elements are dissolved within the melting pot of Islam, blurring the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them.’

The long-standing, sound promise of coexistence and harmony in the Middle East was shattered at the beginning of the 20th century by the imperialist expansionism and disregard for other cultures by Western powers that trampled upon the values of others in the name of religion and civilization. Constant conflict and strife, terrorism, and war between religions, ethnicities, sects, and nations transformed the Middle East into a completely different landscape. The painful experience of Muslims’ past, where contact with the West during the process of modernization yielded only exploitation and immorality, has also fueled extreme struggles among Islamic radicals, who have lost other means of resistance. However, it is more appropriate to describe interreligious relations in the Middle East as cooperative rather than confrontational throughout history.

A close examination of the Middle East’s modern history reveals that indigenous Jews and Arabs, sharing the limited ecosystem of Palestine territories, have coexisted for nearly 1,900 years without conflict or major conflict. It is rare to find a history of two disparate ethnic groups coexisting peacefully for so long, making concessions and sharing limited resources. In this sense, the Arab-Israeli conflict, is less about religious issues and more about territorial issues, a struggle for survival, and a demand for autonomy and independence. Therefore, fostering a “culture of peace” through interreligious communication is entirely possible and will be a meaningful beginning.

1. 글을 시작하며

“매번 매순간 유대인들은 샬롬 알레이헴(שָׁלוֹם אֲלֵיכֶם Shalom Aleichem), 아랍인들은 앓쌀라무 알라이쿰(اَسْأَلُكُمْ بِالسَّلَامِ As-salāmu ‘alaykum) 이라고 인사한다. ‘그대에게 평화가 있기를..’이라는 뜻이다. 이슬람(الإسلام)이란 언어적 의미도 ‘평화’이고 예루살렘의 의미는 ‘평화의 터전’이다. 중동은 이처럼 평화가 넘치고 평화가 충만한 세상을 노래하고 꿈꾸는 곳이다”

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오랜 협력과 조화의 보이지 않는 약속은 20세기가 시작되면서 서구 강대국의 경제적 야욕과 종교와문명의 이름으로 남의 가치를 무참히 짓밟는 비종교적-반문명적 야만에 의해 산산이 깨져 버렸다. 종교, 민족, 종파 그리고 국가 간에 끊임없는 분쟁과 갈등, 테러와 전쟁이 중동을 전혀 다른 모습으로 바꾸었다. 근대화 과정에서 서구와의 접촉으로 얻을 수 있었던 것은 착취와 부도덕뿐이었다는 무슬림의 과거 역사에 대한 뼈저린 경험은 다른 저항 수단을 잃어버린 이슬람 급진 세력의 극단적인 투쟁을 불러오기도 했다. 그러나 오랜 역사를 통해 중동에서 종교 간 관계는 대립보다는 협력적이었다는 표현이 더 적절하다. 중동 근대사를 면밀히 검토해 보더라도 갈릴리 호수와 요르단강이라는 제한된 생태계를 공유하면서 토착 유대인과 아랍인이 1,900년 가까이 분쟁과 큰 갈등 없이 공존해 온 사실을 발견할 수 있다. 지구상에 서로 이질적인 두 민족 집단이 그토록 오랫동안 서로 양보하고 제한된 자원을 나누면서 평화롭게 공존한 역사를 쉽게 찾을 수 없을 정도다. 따라서 19세기말부터 시작된 유대인들의 대거 이주, 20세기 중반 이후 최근 70여 년간, 이스라엘 건국(1948) 이후에 격화된 아랍-이스라엘 갈등은 종교적 문제라기 보다는 영토적 이슈, 생존권 투쟁, 독립과 자치라는 자주권 요구의 성격이 훨씬 강하다. 따라서 종교 간 소통을 통해 ‘평화의 문화’를 심는 작업은 충분히 가능하고 나아가 의미 있는 시작이 될 것이다.

2. 중동에서 공존의 역사적 경험과 실천적 사례 (딤키-밀레트-콘비벤시아)

우선 중동 및 북아프리카(MENA) 지역의 공존 문제를 단순히 폭력이나 갈등이 부재한 상태를 넘어서는 서로 다른 민족, 종교, 종파, 문화적 정체성을 가진 집단들이 공유된 정치-사회적 공간 내에서 평화적으로 상호작용하고, 제도적 장치를 통해 그들의 정체성과 자율성이 인정받는 상태로 정의한다. 이러한 제도적 장치는 시행착오를 통해 오랜 중동-이슬람 역사속에서 실험되고 정착되었다. 초기 이슬람 정권은 이미 9세기경에 소수집단 보호 제도인 딤키(Dhimmi) 시스템, 혹은 아흘 알 딤키(Ahl al-dhimma: 계약의 백성) 제도를 운영하고 이슬람 율법체제에 이를 반영했다. 딤키는 이슬람국가의 허용된 보호받는 비무슬림 시민들을 일컫는 법률 용어였다. 그것은 꾸란의 공존 정신에 근거하고 있었다.

“종교에는 강요가 없다. 진리는 분명 오류와 구분되나니..(꾸란 2:256)

“그대는 그들의 뜻에 반하여 강제로 믿음을 강요하려 하느냐?(꾸란 10:9)

역사적 과정에서 종교간 폭력과 억압의 행위가 수없이 반복되었지만, 이슬람 정권들은 이러한 공존의 기본 정신을 사회통합의 우선순위에 두고자 했던 점은 분명해 보인다.

딤키 제도안에서 유대인이나 기독교인들은 지즈야(Jizya)야 불리는 주민세를 납부하는 조건으로 자신들의 종교공동체내에서 자치권을 인정받았다. 물론 딤키는 무슬림들보다 열등한 지위에서 다양한 차별과 제한을 받았지만, 자신들의 종교적 율법이나 관습법에 따르고, 랍비나 총대주교의 통제를 받았다. 세액의 차별은 있었지만 거래와 무역에서도 완전한 자유를 보장받았다. 무슬림들의 무역세는 40분의 1이었음에 비해, 딤키들은 20분의 1을 납부해야 했다. 무슬림들의 2배에 해당되지만, 무슬림들은 별도로 40분의 1에 해당되는 자카트(Zakat)라는 종교세 의무가 있었다. 딤키에 소속되지 않은 사람들은 10분의 1을 납부해야 했다.

중동에서 확산된 소수민족이나 다른 종교 공동체 구성원들에 대한 관용과 공존의 정신은 이미 아케메네스 페르시아 제국의 창건자인 ‘키루스(기원전 550~530)의 정책에서도 찾을 수 있다. ‘키루스의 원통(Cyrus Cylinder)’으로 알려진 점토판에 새겨진 내용에는 노예제에 대한 부정적인 견해, 정당한 노동의 가치에 해당하는 임금 지급, 종교 생활의 자유에 대한 보장 등을 명시하고 있다. 이에 따라 바빌론 유수(Babylonian Exile) 로 끌려와 있던 유대인들을 해방시켜 밀린 임금을 주고 예루살렘으로 귀환하게 했던 일화는 지금도 인류사회 곳곳에서 이교도 인권존중과 공존의 사례로 자주 회자되고 있다.

키루스 원통의 정신과 딤키 제도는 아랍을 이어 새롭게 이슬람 세계를 통합한 오스만 제국 시대에서도 그대로 계승되었다. 바로 밀레트 제도(Millet System)다. 밀레트는 비무슬림 종파 공동체인 유대교, 아르메니아인, 그리스 정교 등과 같은 종교공동체가 자신의 율법이나 종교적 관행에 따라 자치를 허용 받은 독립적인 사법-문화적 제도를 의미한다. 각 밀레트의 대표인 최고 종교지도자는 술탄에게만 책임지는 막강한 권력으로 자신의 공동체를 통제-관리했다. 나아가 종교나 출신에 크게 제한 받지 않고 공직에 진출할 수 있고, 유대인 출신들이 술탄 다음의 재상자리에 오를 수 있는 제도적 장치가 되었다.

비슷한 시기에 스페인 이베리아 반도의 이슬람 공동체였던 안달루시아에서도 공존을 의미하는 콘비벤시아(Convivencia)가 성행했다. 콘비벤시아 정신안에서 무슬림, 기독교인, 유대인들이 7세기 이상 비교적 평화로운 관계 속에서 공존하며 독특하고 다양한 문화를 꽃피울 수 있었다.

3. 역사를 통해 각인된 갈등과 공존의 기억

이슬람세계와 서구 유럽사이에는 동아시아인들에게는 쉽게 이해하기 어려울 정도의 1200년이라는 오랜 지배-피지배의 역사를 경험했다. 공존의 통한 번영의 시기도 있었지만 전쟁과 갈등을 통한 트라우마의 기억 또한 작지 않았다. 지브롤터 해협이 뚫리는 711년부터 비엔나 공성전투가 벌어지는 1683년까지, 약 천년간은 이슬람 세계가 서구에 대해 우위를 지켜오던 시기였다. 레판토 해전(Battle of Lepanto : 1571년) 같은 부분적인 승리는 있었지만 서슬 퍼런 중세 기독교 유럽세계가 이교도 이슬람으로부터 공격당하고 지배당하는 상태는 스스로 ‘암흑의 시기’로 덮고 싶었던 치욕과 모멸의 시기였을 것이다. 서구가 이슬람세계에 대해 갖고 있는 혐오와 공포의 대명사인 이슬람포비아(Islamophobia)가 형성된 역사적 배경이다. 유럽과 이슬람 세계 관계는 1798년 나폴레옹의 이집트 정복을 기점으로 그 후 200년간 거꾸로 서구가 이슬람 세계를 예외 없이 점령하고 지배하면서 이슬람세계의 반서구-반미 저항의식이 고착화되었다.

중세때는 십자군 전쟁이 유럽과 이슬람 세계의 격돌을 부추기기도 했다. 1099년 1차 십자군 전쟁으로 이슬

람 왕조(Fatimid Caliphate)가 지배하고 있던 예루살렘이 기독교 십자군에 점령당하면서 성 안에 있던 무슬림들과 유대인들은 잔혹하게 몰살당했다. 승리는 항상 이슬람의 편이었다는 무슬림들의 절대신념에 심각한 의문을 제기한 사건이기도 했다. 이슬람 세계가 경험한 최초의 패배였던 만큼 그 충격도 컸다. 그러나 십자군 전쟁에 대한 트라우마는 오래가지 않았다. 이어진 7차례의 십자군 전쟁은 이슬람권과는 상관없는 약탈 전쟁으로 돌변했고 심지어 1204년 4차 십자군 전쟁은 동방 기독교의 심장부인 콘스탄티노플을 약탈하기도 했다. 결과적으로 1187년 아랍 장군 유수프 살라딘(Yusuf Saladdin)이 다시 예루살렘을 정복하여 관용정책을 펼침으로써 유럽세계에 대한 이슬람 세계의 확실한 우위를 다시한번 보여주었다. 오스만 제국 통치시기의 300여년동안에도 팔레스타인은 다수의 아랍인과 소수의 기독교인과 유대인들이 함께 살아왔다. 그들은 대체로 평화롭게 공존했으며, 경제적, 사회적으로 큰 마찰 없이 지내는 경우가 많았다. 그러나 팔레스타인을 중심으로 토착 아랍인과 토착 유대인, 기독교인들 사이의 공존과 상생의 기본정신은 19세기부터 조금씩 훼손되기 시작했다. 19세기말 유럽에서 팽배한 반유대주의(Anti-Semitism)의 심화로 유대 민족 국가 건설 운동인 시온주의가 힘을 얻음과 동시에 대이주(Aliyah)가 일어나면서 부터였다. 유럽과 러시아 등지에서 박해를 피한 많은 유대인들이 팔레스타인으로 이주하였고, 그들은 토지를 매입하고 농업 정착촌을 건설하기 시작했다. 유대인들의 이주 규모가 커지면서 유대인 이주민들은 경작지와 거주지를 늘어가면서 유대인 노동력만을 사용하는 배타적인 정책을 펼쳐나갔다. 토착 아랍인들과의 경제적, 사회적 긴장이 생겨나는 것은 필연적이었다.

1917~1947년으로 이어지는 영국 위임 통치령 시기에 사실상 오늘의 중동 분쟁과 갈등의 모든 불씨가 잉태되었다. 제1차 세계대전을 승리로 이끌기 위한 불가피한 선택으로 영국과 프랑스는 1915년 후세인 맥마흔 서한(Hussein-McMahon Correspondence)을 통해 아랍인들의 지지를 확보하였고, 미국의 1차 세계대전 참전유도와 영국-프랑스의 안정적 전쟁승리를 위해 1917년 뵈푸어 선언(Balfour Declaration)을 통해 팔레스타인 영토에 유대 민족국가(Jewish National Home) 창설을 보장해 주었다. 놀랍게도 1916년에는 영국대표 사이크스와 프랑스 대표 피코가 사이크스-피코 비밀협정(Sykes-Picot Agreement)을 통해 중동 영토를 나눠 갖기로 한 것이다. 이에 따르면 팔레스타인 영토는 영국이 갖게 되어 있었다. 팔레스타인이라는 사람이 살고 있는 현실적 삶의 공간을 아랍인과 유대인들에게 각각의 독립공간을 약속하고 자신들끼리는 지배야욕을 숨기지 않았던 세계의 상호모순된 비밀 협정이 오늘날 중동의 분쟁과 갈등을 촉발한 근원적인 문제인 셈이다. 뵈푸어 선언의 정신에 따라 대규모 이주와 인구 변화, 특히 1920년대와 1930년대 나치의 박해를 피해 대규모 유대인 난민이 팔레스타인으로 유입되면서 인구 구성비가 급격히 변했다. 이는 토착 아랍인들에게 심각한 위협으로 인식되었다. 그 결과 토지 문제와 이민 문제로 인해 아랍인과 유대인 간의 폭력과 충돌이 빈번해지기 시작했다. 무슬림들이 수십 년간 평화롭게 살았던 유대인들을 공격하는 1929년 헤브론 학살 사건을 기점으로 1936-1939년 사이에 아랍인들이 영국의 위임통치와 유대인 이주에 반대하며 대규모 봉기를 일으켰다. 이 사건 전후로 공존의 약속이 붕괴되면서 무슬림과 유대인 양측은 각자의 종교적 결속과 민족주의 의식을 강화하며 무장 조직을 결성하게 되었다.

상호공존과 사태 수습에 실패한 영국 정부는 결국 팔레스타인 문제를 유엔에 넘겼고, 미국이 주도한 유엔은 1947년 팔레스타인 분할안을 통과시켰다. 아랍인들은 도저히 받아들일 수 없는 불공정한 반쪽 국가를 거부했고, 유대인들은 이를 수용하면서 1948년 이스라엘은 건국을 선언했다(이날은 팔레스타인들에게는 '나크바(Nakbah)' 즉 "재앙의 날로 기념되고 있다). 이제 양측은 피할 수 없는 갈등과 폭력의 시대를 맞이하였고, 4차례의 중동전쟁과 78년간의 생존과 안보 논리의 투쟁을 계속하고 있다.

공존의 역사적 합의가 깨어진 상태에서 자신들의 영토적 탈환과 적의 공격으로부터 안보를 지키고자 하는 아랍-유대 양대 세력들은 각각 종교적 감수성에 호소하는 방식을 선호했다. 이슬람 극단주의자들이 확산되고 1970년대 이후부터는 석유가 본격적으로 개발되어 세계 경제의 핵심적인 자원이 되자 서구는 석유라는 절대국익을 지키기 위해 아랍권의 분열과 무조건적인 이스라엘 보호 정책을 표방함으로써 공존의 땅은 갈수록 갈등과 분열의 땅으로 변질되었다. 동시에 많은 중동 국가들도 종교적 연대와 형제애라는 전통적인 담론을 벗어나서 글로벌 가치 우선과 자국 이익 중심의 각자도생을 길로 들어섰다.

일찍이 타미 안사리(Tamim Ansari)가 '이슬람의 눈으로 본 세계사'에서 지적했듯이 어떤 시대적 상황에서 이슬람 근본주의자들이 승리를 거둔 적도 있었지만, 이제는 신기술과 초첨단 네트워크 시대에 그들의 입지는 좁아지고 있다. 오늘날 석유가 더 이상 미국의 절대국익으로 작동하지 않고 세계 최대 에너지 패권국으로서 탈중동 정책을 본격화하면서 중동-이슬람 세계도 새로운 냉전 구도를 고착화하면서 요동치고 있다. 미국이 떠난 자리에 중국과 러시아의 패권적 이익이 빠르게 자리를 잡아가고 있고, 힘의 공백상황에서 자국 안보 확보에 더욱 집착하는 이스라엘 정권의 지나친 정치적-영토적 야욕과 이에 맞서는 반서구 중동 정권들의 대결로 이 시각 중동에서는 다시 공존보다는 전쟁의 소용돌이가 휘몰아치고 있다.

4. 대화와 공존을 위한 선결조건과 노력

1) 문명충돌에서 문명 공존으로

특히 서구 문명과 이슬람 문명 간의 갈등이 역사적 뿌리가 깊고 가장 폭력적이며 위험할 것이라고 경고했던 사무엘 헌팅턴의 문명충돌론(1993년)은 외관상 그럴듯하고 보였지만, 그 본질이 종교나 문명권과는 거리가 먼 각국의 이해관계 충돌이라는 점에서 비판 또한 적지 않았다. 독일의 하랄트 뮐러, 미국의 에드워드 사이드, 노암 촘스키, 영국의 아마르티아 센, 타리크 알리 등과 같은 세계적인 석학들은 문명 충돌의 원인을 다른 요인에서 찾으려 오�히려 문명 공존의 가능성을 설파했다. 1996년 하랄트 뮐러가 분석한 내용에 따르면, 27건의 폭력위기 중에 단지 9건만이 문명간의 충돌이고, 나머지는 단일 문명권에서 일어났다. 그에 의하면 전쟁과 유혈폭력사태의 2/3 이상이 인종문제와 관련되어 일어나고 있다. 대규모 인구유입을 통한 인구구성비의 인위적 조작, 식수부족이나 농지 잠식 등 자연환경의 오염으로 인한 생태학적 스트레스가 소수집단의 정체성을 위협하게 될 때, 필연적으로 지배집단과의 갈등이 심화된다고 보았다. 이 때 종교와 이데올로기는 소속 집단을 결속시키는 강력한 '사회적 시멘트'로 기능한다고 보았다. 다른 측면에서 문명충돌론은 오리엔탈리즘의 입장과도 맥이 통한다. 문명충돌론이 미국과 서구를 문명화된 강대국으로 설정한 것 자체가 오리엔탈리즘이 재생산해 왔던 편견을 답습하고 있기 때문이다. 문명충돌론도 얼핏 보면 상이한 문명간의 충돌이 본질적인 것처럼 묘사되지만, 그 바탕에는 문명화된 서구가 우월적으로 존재하고 있고 서구의 공격을 정당화하려는 전략적 의도가 노골적으로 드러난다.

그럼 어떻게 문명간 충돌이 아닌 문명간 대화를 이끌어내고 새로운 담론을 제시할 수 있을까. 현재 빌 게이츠 재단이 추진하고 있는 빅히스토리(Big History) 프로젝트가 그나마 인상적인 대안으로 평가된다. 인류의 다양한 삶과 역사를 빅뱅에서 현재까지 138억년이라는 하나의 지구사 관점으로 접근하면서 기존의 서양 중심 역사에서 인류사 전체로 새롭게 조망해 보자는 취지다. 그래서 중동-이슬람권 역사는 물론 아프리카, 중앙아시아, 동남아시아, 라틴 아메리카 등지의 역사도 비중 있게 다룬 인류의 공동 교과서를 집필해 함께 배우자는 것이다. 획일화된 문화를 강요하는 독선과 이로 인한 갈등과 전쟁 보다는 138억년이란 긴 우주역사 속에서 인류의 존재가치를 깨닫게 하자는 것이다.

또 하나 노벨 경제학상을 받은 아마르티아 센 교수가 제시한 “문화적 자유”, “다원적 정체성” 개념을 통해 새로운 가르침을 얻을 수 있다. 네 편과 내 편, 하나의 종교, 하나의 이념만이 아니라 인류가 태생적으로 갖고 있는 다원적 정체성을 인정하고 교육하자는 것이다. 예를 들면 기독교인이면서도 절에도 가보고 이슬람 친구들을 사귀어 보는 일이 자연스러운 문화를 말한다. 센 교수는 문화적 자유와 정체성의 이성적 선택권을 강조함으로써 이주민들이 주류사회에 동화를 택하건 자신의 과거 정체성을 유지하건 그것을 개인적 판단에 맡기자는 입장을 취한다.

“문명충돌론은 각국의 이해관계나 욕망의 충돌, 정치권력을 유지하기 위한 수단으로 이용되어 온 측면이 강하다”고 본 파키스탄 출신 영국 작가 타리크 알리도 9.11 테러와 IS 준동 그리고 십자군 전쟁의 정신으로 맞서는 서구세력간의 갈등을 주류간의 대치라기보다는 소수 세력에 의한 “무지의 충돌(Clash of Ignorance)”로 설명한다. 또 이란 전 대통령 모함마드 하타미는 “문명간의 대화”를 주창해 신선한 충격을 주었다. 유엔은 그의 주장을 받아들여 2001년을 “문명간 대화”의 해로 선포하기도 했다. 문명 충돌보다는 문명간 화해나 공존을 통해 서로 다른 가치를 인정하고 상대를 이해하는 방식으로 인류의 미래가 펼쳐질 수 있을 것이라는 희망의 메시지들이다.

동시에 급진적 보수 성향의 일부 이슬람 사회 자체의 변화노력도 무엇보다 중요하다. 꾸란의 재해석을 통해 글로벌 스탠다드를 수용하면서 전근대적이고 반인권적인 악습들을 과감하게 떨쳐내는 개혁이 필요해 보인다. 이런 점에서 40여년의 사회적 논쟁을 딛고 최근 여성 운전을 허용하고 여성의 참정권을 인정한 사우디와 히잡 착용의 자율적 선택 움직임을 보이는 이란의 변화는 박수를 보낼 만한 개혁의 신호탄이다.

2) 공존을 위한 선결조건으로 종교간 소통의 중요성

종교 간 소통과 이해도 향상은 체계적인 학교 교육에서 시작해야 한다. 공통의 커리큘럼 개발과 합의를 통해 국제 문화 이해, 문화 다원주의, 문화상대주의 등의 교육을 강화하고 아래로부터 두터운 인식의 하부 구조를 마련해 가는 노력이 절실하다. 상대의 잔혹성을 부풀려 자신의 또 다른 잔혹함을 정당화하는 정치인의 정략적 언설보다는 함께 공존하면서 실제적 상대로 인정하는 종교 지도자들의 인식 전환은 물론, 사회 지도층의 지혜와 혜안이 필요하다. 이를 위해 종교 간 대화와 소통의 채널도 다양해져야 한다. 종교 지도자들뿐만 아니라 아카데미즘(종교학자), 사회 공동체, 시민 단체 등 종교가 다른 동일 구성원끼리의 교류와 이해를 일상화하는 풀뿌리 논의로 확산되어야 한다. 이 지점에서 우리는 종교학자 카렌 암스트롱의 메시지를 경청해야 한다. “우리는 서로의 종교에 대해 더 많이 공부하고 이해해야 한다. 그것은 그 종교를 받아들이기 위해서가 아니라 적어도 다른 사람의 고귀한 신앙에 불신과 편견, 무지를 심지 않기 위해서다.”

특히 한국 사회에서 무슬림은 여전히 이질적인 존재다. 무엇보다 70여 년이란 짧은 역사에서 토착화가 되지 못한 종교가 겪는 초기 단계의 정체성 혼란으로 보인다. 한국 사회에서 독자적인 창으로 무슬림을 들여다볼 기회가 부족했고, 정치적, 경제적, 군사적으로 대결하고 있는 적대적 이해 당사자 격인 미국과 서구 중심의 언론, 자료, 시각, 가치관을 통해 이슬람권 문제를 바라보며 축적된 지적 편중의 문제를 들 수 있다. 무슬림이 주도적 우위를 점하고 있는 말레이시아는 가장 이상적인 종족 간-종교 간 황금 분할(말레이족-중국 화교-인도인)과 다문화 정신이 정착되어 있고, 세계 최대 무슬림 국가인 인도네시아에서도 ‘판차실라(Panchasilla)’라는 융합 정신에 따라 신을 믿는 모든 종교 행위와 자유를 헌법으로 보장하고 있다. 물론 이러한 조화와 균형이 항상 이상적 형태로 유지되는 것은 아니다. 불교 중심 국가인 태국에서는 남부 파타니

주를 중심으로 일부 극단적 무슬림 분리주의자의 자치 독립운동이 벌어지고, 무슬림 집단 거주지인 필리핀 남부 민다나오 섬에서도 중세 이슬람 술탄국의 전통을 꿈꾸며 일부 무슬림 극단주의자들에 의한 무장 자치 투쟁이 진행 중이다.

3) 공존과 평화를 위한 노력들

세계적인 지휘자인 이스라엘의 다니엘 바렌보임은 팔레스타인 젊은이들을 중심으로 여러 국가의 무슬림 음악가들과 함께 평화의 오케스트라를 결성했다. 1999년 중동 평화를 염원하며 창단한 ‘웨스트-이스턴 디반 오케스트라’는 유대인인 바렌보임과 팔레스타인 출신 문명비평가 에드워드 사이드(1935~2003)가 주역이다. 지금도 단원의 40%는 이스라엘, 40%는 아랍, 20%는 유럽 음악인이다. 이처럼 바렌보임은 폭력의 악순환이 멈추지 않는 중동 지역에서 음악을 통해서 공존을 모색하는 실천적 음악가로 존경을 받았다. 그는 2005년 팔레스타인 서안 지구의 수도 라말라에서 콘서트를 열었을 뿐만 아니라, 지금은 처참한 폐허가 된 가자지구의 고고학 박물관에서 2011년 5월 ‘가자를 위한 관현악단’이라는 공연을 개최했다. 평화의 메시지를 전하기 위해 베를린 필과 베를린 국립관현악단, 빈 필, 파리 오케스트라, 라 스칼라 오페라 관현악단의 단원들이 모두 모여 감동의 올스타 공연을 한 것이다. 이스라엘 국민으로 팔레스타인 명예 시민권을 가진 위대한 평화 지휘자는 이스라엘과 팔레스타인의 화해와 공존을 주창하면서 이스라엘 평화운동가들과 함께 팔레스타인을 위한 평화 시위를 벌이고 정착촌 건설에 반대하는 용기 있는 행보를 계속해 왔다. 이스라엘 국회에 의해 한때 기피 인물로 규정당하는 불이익을 받았지만 바렌보임은 굴하지 않았고, 결국 그의 평화주의는 2004년 이스라엘 국회가 수여하는 예술계의 노벨상인 올프상을 수상하면서 이스라엘 내부의 존경까지도 이끌어냈다. 2016년 이 오케스트라는 유엔 평화 대사로 지명됐다.

또 다른 예는 이스라엘 영화감독 에란 리클리스다. 그의 작품은 주로 정치적, 사회적 문제를 다루며, 인간적인 시각으로 이야기를 풀어내는 것으로 유명인데, ‘레몬트리’ ‘시리아 신부’ ‘댄싱 아랍’ 같은 영화가 대표적이다. 영화를 통해 리클리스 감독은 이스라엘과 팔레스타인 분쟁이나 두 민족간의 갈등이나 사랑을 예술적으로 풀어냄으로써 평화와 공존에 기여했다는 평가를 받고 있다. ‘레몬트리’는 이스라엘 국방장관의 집과 팔레스타인 여성의 레몬 밭을 둘러싼 갈등을 통해, 평범한 사람들의 삶이 정치적 상황에 어떻게 영향을 받고, 이스라엘과 팔레스타인 분쟁의 복잡성과 그로 인한 고통을 현실적으로 묘사한다. 일찍 남편을 잃고, 아이들도 모두 집을 떠난 상황에서 한 팔레스타인 여인에게 가해지는 이스라엘의 강제와 폭력을 고발하면서, 인간의 존엄성을 지키며 이웃으로 함께 살아야 할 절박한 가치를 호소한다. 무엇보다 에란 리클리스 감독의 영화들은 단순히 정치적 메시지를 전달하는 것을 넘어, 인간적인 공감대를 형성하고 갈등 해결을 위한 대화의 필요성을 일깨워준다는 점에서 강한 감동을 자아낸다.

이스라엘과 팔레스타인 사이의 공존을 약속했던 ‘오슬로 평화협정’을 전폭적으로 지지하면서 이스라엘의 양심으로 불렸던 작가 아모스 오즈도 빼놓을 수 없다. 대문호로서 그의 문학적 업적은 페미나상, 런던 윙게이트상, 토리노 국제도서전상, 괴테 문화상, 프랑스 드뇌르 훈장, 이스라엘 문화상 등을 수상하였고, 2018년 작고 직전인 2016년에는 박경리 문학상을 수상하기도 했다. 아모스 오즈는 두 국가 공존을 위해 헌신했으며, 서안지구의 이스라엘의 정착촌 건설에도 강하게 반대했다. 나아가 팔레스타인 지도자들과도 교분을 유지하며 핍박받는 팔레스타인 주민들의 고통을 함께 했던 진정한 평화주의자였다. 오즈는 이스라엘의 대표적인 평화 운동 시민단체로 348명의 이스라엘 예비역 군인들이 창립한 ‘피스 나우(Peace Now)’ 활동에 적극적으로 참여하면서 이스라엘의 폭력성에 비판을 가하면서 팔레스타인 문제의 평화적 해결을 위한 활동

에 앞장섰다. 이스라엘-팔레스타인 분쟁 지역 내의 '풀뿌리(grassroots)' 평화 구축 활동을 하는 비정부기구(NGO)인 '중동평화를 위한 동맹(ALLMEP :Alliance for Middle East Peace)'의 평화구축 활동도 눈여겨 볼만하다.

무엇보다 중요한 것은 아랍인이나 무슬림들의 인식전환이다. 언제까지 중동을 둘러싸고 벌어졌던 근세 역사에 대한 분노와 좌절에 머물러 있을 것인가? 새로운 미래에 걸맞는 개혁과 의식의 전환을 서둘러야 한다. 그들은 이미 서구체제에 대한 무조건적 반대와 대항보다는 전통적인 이슬람 규범속에서 새로운 발전과 변화를 수용하는 조화와 절충의 묘를 찾아 자기 목소리를 내기 시작했다. 이는 서구식 제도나 체제를 모방함으로써가 아닌 철저히 이슬람적인 자기들에 바탕을 둔 내적인 혁신과 적절한 재해석의 방법을 통해 사회의 발전과 현대화를 추구하는 것이다. 다양성이 포용된 공존과 조화의 회복이야말로 이슬람정신의 근본이자 초심으로 돌아가는 길이다. 그리고 그 무대는 인류가 함께 사는 방법을 처음 시작한 중동으로부터 되어야 한다.

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AI 편향성

Phinith Chanthalangsy | 피니스 찬탈랑시

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Fast and Slow – Co-existence between Disruptions and Co-evolution with AI

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Abstract

Building on the astrobiologist Sara Imari Walker's framing of technology and life as continuous phenomena, Artificial intelligence (AI) can be interpreted as the continuation of a 3.8-billion-year process of biological, cognitive, and cultural evolution. In this perspective, the Technosphere that seems to increasingly frame and determine our contemporary life and future is not (should not be?) that disconnected from the Biosphere that encompasses human lives in a broader environment and dynamics. This paper interrogates the underlying beliefs of our global normative debates on the ethics of AI: What is it that we feel urgent and morally obliged to preserve of our human character? Articulating the philosopher Bernard Stiegler's critique of technological disruption and loss of collective individuation, this paper argues that responsible co-evolution requires designing socio-technical institutions that preserve human attention, promote new forms of knowledge, promote shared care structures, and enable reciprocal adaptation between humans and AI. By doing so, the roles of global Organizations such as UNESCO are analysed, in a time of major shift in multilateralism.

Introduction

Borrowing the title from Daniel Kahneman's *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (2011), this paper interrogates the ways in which human societies at large – individuals, firms, and governments – perceive and react to the speedy development and deployment of AI today. Such development has been extremely fast of course, but at the same time, sciences teach us that each technology emerges from a long and slow evolution of conditions in nature and societies.

Life on Earth has undergone a continuous transformation since its origins roughly 3.8 billion years ago, producing successively more complex forms of information processing, metabolism, and environment-shaping behavior. Recent scholarship positions technology and especially AI not as alien inventions, but as extensions of life's capacity to harness physical processes for persistent information storage and manipulation, reframing AI as a living-lineage phenomenon rather than a sharp rupture.

However, the role of human intentionality must be questioned in such an evolution. If biological evolution has produced bird wings or the unique device that we call "eyes," isn't that totally different from IT engineers who develop AI technology? The latter's intentions seem to be single human-generated technologies. Yet, how is that so different? Philosophical critiques treat the rise of computational systems as a major disruption to social and psychic individuation, raising urgent ethical questions about attention, memory, and collective agency. What is it that, essentially threatened, needs to be preserved imperatively?

Evolutionary Continuity and Technology

Complexity in biological systems has repeatedly generated new kinds of persistent information media (e.g., genetic code, nervous systems, language, institutions) (Sarah Imari Walker, 2023).¹⁾ Technologies—including computation and AI—are successive materializations of that same trend: engineered media that extend organisms' capacities to store, process, and transmit information across scales and times. Framing AI as part of an evolutionary continuum emphasizes emergence, contingency, and functional analogy between biological and technological information systems. It also interrogates the concepts of intentionality and human essence (dignity, freedom, etc.) when it comes to reflecting on human-machine's interactions. If new technologies and the ways we interact with them are "natural" results of a long bio- and technical evolution, is there a place for ethics and morality? Who are we – humans – to judge what is to be preserved and perpetuated for us, knowingly the next generations of humans?

Disruption and Individuation

1) Sarah Imari Walker, AI Is Life, in Noema Magazine, 2023

Contemporary critiques from political and continental philosophy highlight how computational capitalism reorganizes attention, labor, and individuation.²⁾ Bernard Stiegler diagnoses an epistemic and affective “entropy” produced by attention-extracting systems and automated industrial processes, which dissolve shared symbolic culture and weaken the conditions for collective responsibility and individuation. Bernard Stiegler describes disruption as a technological and socio-economic process that fundamentally reorganizes collective life by altering attention, memory, and modes of individuation, producing pathological effects when left to market dynamics.

This diagnosis reframes AI not only as a continuation of life but simultaneously as a force that can erode social capacities developed over human history. It transforms attention into a commodified resource through algorithmic capture and engagement-maximizing architecture, generating widespread psychic distress and diminished capacity for sustained reflection. In this sense, disruption concentrates decision-making and normative power in the hands of techno-economic actors who control infrastructures, producing new asymmetries that limit democratic control and steer societies toward lock-ins and path-dependent futures

The Ethical Challenges of Co-evolution

The rise of AI reshapes how minds and societies develop by changing the very environments that sculpt attention, memory, and learning. AI-driven attention economies fragment sustained focus and rewire cognitive habits, producing path dependencies that steer social learning and influence long-term evolutionary trajectories. As everyday interfaces prioritize immediacy and engagement, individuals face new strains on psychic health and diminishing capacities for deep reflection, with consequences that compound across generations.

Simultaneously, pervasive personalization threatens the shared symbolic frameworks that underpin democratic life. When algorithmic curation atomizes publics into isolated informational niches that self-entertain individuals as separated atoms, the common ground required for collective deliberation, civic education, and the intergenerational transmission of norms faces risks of erosion. This erosion undermines the processes of collective individuation by which communities form shared meanings and responsibilities, and individuals develop singularities and emancipate from single-handed discourses and systems.

These cultural risks are amplified by profound power asymmetries. Corporate control over large-scale AI infrastructures concentrates decision-making power and the ability to set default behaviors, narrowing society’s options for adaptive co-evolution. The resulting technological and institutional lock-ins create irreversible path dependencies: once certain infrastructures and business models are entrenched, they have high chance to bias future

2) Bernard Stiegler, *The Age of Disruption: Technology and Madness in Computational Capitalism*, 2019.

development toward outcomes that may marginalize pluralistic human flourishing.

Finally, viewing AI as the product of a long evolutionary process raises difficult questions about moral status and agency. While these debates matter, ethical debates during this transitional phase will benefit from interrogating the status of our normative frameworks crafted to safeguard human flourishing and ecosystem integrity. That requires designing governance, economic incentives, social institutions, and emancipating individuals that resist extractive lock-ins, protect shared cognitive and cultural capacities, and preserve the conditions for equitable, reversible co-adaptation between humans and their technologies.

Principles for Human–AI Co-evolution

In 2021, UNESCO member States adopted the first-ever UN normative framework on AI, the Recommendation of the Ethics of AI.³⁾ The spirit behind this Recommendation lies on the principle of human flourishing, oversight and determination. Such principles require reciprocity in designing systems that support genuine two-way adaptation: human communities must continuously shape AI through governance, value embedding, and oversight, while AI’s affordances should reshape human practices in ways that are transparent, accountable, and reversible. To sustain the social fabric that makes collective life possible, the Recommendation insists on preserving shared symbolic spaces, along the line of Bernard Stiegler’s ecology, such as schools, public media, libraries, and communal rituals that carry collective memory, enable deliberation, and transmit norms across generations.

But Stiegler’s analysis points to some even more important issues that are at stake in the face of increasing human interactions with AI. That relates to stewardship of scarce cognitive resources; attention stewardship calls for regulations and business-model changes that end incentives to monetize distraction and instead favor interfaces and algorithms that scaffold sustained reflection, deep work, and civic engagement. In this perspective, concentrations of technological power must be checked through distributed governance: control of critical infrastructures should be diffused across multi-stakeholder bodies, public platforms, to promote and allow plurality and avoid that societies are locked into narrow evolutionary paths. Finally, co-evolution must be understood as a biosocial project: ecological embeddedness means evaluating AI interventions against planetary boundaries and multispecies impacts so choices promote long-term planetary and human flourishing rather than short-term extractive gains.

Finally, co-evolution must be understood as a biosocial project: ecological embeddedness means evaluating AI interventions against planetary boundaries and multispecies impacts

3) UNESCO, Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, 2021, <https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/recommendation-ethics-artificial-intelligence>

so choices promote long-term planetary and human flourishing rather than short-term extractive gains.

What can global Organizations change?

It is interesting to note that our current multilateral system – the UN – emerged from a major and tragic disruption by which political regimes as well as human societies have ravaged human values of peace, dignity, and co-existence with prejudices, hatred, and violence. In a sense, such a system crafted to help humankind build and preserve peace also belongs to the long history of evolution that Imari Walker describes. Eighty years after, we may face the extreme urgency of reactivating this “political technology” that we have collectively elaborated because of our tragic history. A multilateral Organisation like UNESCO speaks powerfully to the need of interrogating ourselves in the face of new potential disruptions that are being brought about by AI. The words of UNESCO’s Constitution (1945) speak for themselves:

“The Ignorance of each other’s ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war;

The great and terrible war which has now ended was a war made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men, and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and prejudice, of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races;

The wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern;”

In Stiegler’s words, to support collective individuation, our world needs to invest in a public digital commons and civic AI—open models, shared civic datasets, and community-run platforms that encode pluralistic values and enable democratic uses rather than consumer capture. We need to reform curricula to include education for co-evolutionary literacy, teaching adaptive reasoning, media literacy, systems thinking, and ethical engineering from early stages so citizens can steward socio-technical change. Finally, we are called upon to explore and set up modalities through which organizations and governments conduct algorithmic impact assessments with long-horizon scenarios that analyze second- and third-order effects on attention regimes, social individuation, labor ecosystems, and ecological systems, coupled with enforceable mitigation plans to prevent harmful lock-ins.

Conclusion

Interpreting AI as both a product of a 3.8-billion-year evolutionary trajectory and as a disruptive force clarifies that ethical responses must combine humility about deep continuity and vigilance about contemporary ruptures. Human–AI co-evolution should be intentionally steered through institutional design, regulatory interventions, and cultural practices that protect shared symbolic capacity, manage attention, and distribute control. Such a program treats technological emergence as an evolutionary opportunity that must be stewarded to sustain human and planetary flourishing rather than surrendered to extractive path dependencies. The most difficult question remains: Who can make this happen? With our multilateral and global institutions at hands, how can we use them efficiently?

공존과 협력의 관계적 관점에서 본 도덕적 행위자로 서의 인공지능

AI as a Moral Agent from the Relational View- point of Co-existence and Collaboration

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Abstract

The objective of this paper is to understand and investigate the ethical use of AI from the perspective of artificial moral agents (for example, agentic AI with moral decision-making abilities). Since rapidly advancing AI technology affects human life and human civilization, and AI is becoming more and more autonomous beyond their levels of assistant AI and augmented AI, it is imperative to understand the significance of AMA (Artificial Moral Agent) research and to discuss the cognitive and ethical standards of artificial moral agency and the ideal conditions of human AI interaction, collaboration, and coexistence. In consideration of the critical importance of AMA research, therefore, the goal of the philosophical study developed in this paper is to stimulate our critical and innovative thinking to explore and investigate the moral abilities of an autonomous and responsible system (i.e., agent) interacting with human beings in its collaborative relationship from the broad philosophical viewpoint of moral agency and human AI interaction and coexistence, specifically in the context of the relational approach to artificial moral agent.

Introduction

This paper discusses philosophical and moral issues of artificial moral agents (AI or robotic systems with decision-making ability). Currently, there are many discussions and debates on the nature, operations, and functions of agentic AI and robotic systems, specifically on their agency and moral/legal responsibilities when they interact with human beings.¹⁾ These artificial systems can challenge the traditional (face to face, empathic, and other-respecting and -caring) modes of social interactions human beings have cultivated with each other for many years.²⁾ In addition, systems of AI and robots do not have beliefs and desires. They do not seem to have inner affective states such as emotions and feelings, either. But do they have the ability to think and behave morally by understanding moral norms and values? In other words, can a fully developed system of AI be a moral agent?

Although AI and robotic systems are designed and programmed by human engineers to serve our cognitive and computational needs, they behave as if they have their own ways of thinking and decision-making that are often perceived to be the work of independent systems. From self-driving cars and AI-powered drones to autonomous trading systems, many computational systems have been developed and used as independent systems of their own decision-making abilities. Simply, they can be understood as agents, i.e., systems that can think and act autonomously. Do they have moral abilities and responsibilities? If they become autonomous agents, do they interact and collaborate with humans in their common understanding of moral values? In this paper, the author will discuss how the current studies of AI ethics (such as the standard view, the functionalist view, and the relational view) explain how and when the artificial systems (AI and robots) can be moral agents, and critically evaluate how autonomous systems of computation can interact, collaborate, and coexist with human beings from the relational viewpoint of artificial moral agent.

The objective of this paper is to understand and investigate the ethical use of AI from the perspective of artificial moral agents (for example, agentic AI with moral decision-making abilities). Since rapidly advancing AI technology affects human life and human civilization, and AI is becoming more and more autonomous beyond their levels of assistant AI and augmented AI, it is imperative to understand the significance of AMA (Artificial Moral Agent) research and to discuss the cognitive and ethical standards of artificial moral agency and the ideal conditions of human AI interaction, collaboration, and coexistence. In consideration of the critical importance of AMA research, therefore, the goal of the philosophical study developed in this paper is to stimulate our critical and innovative thinking to explore and investigate the moral abilities of an autonomous and responsible system (i.e., agent) interacting with human beings in its collaborative relationship from the broad philosophical

1) Behdadi and Munthe (2020) and Suchman (2019).

2) Kim and Kim (2013).

viewpoint of moral agency and human AI interaction and coexistence, specifically in the context of the relational approach to artificial moral agent.

To achieve the objectives of this paper, the author will discuss current studies of artificial moral agents. There are different ways to explain the moral agency of artificial systems (robotic system, AI, and other systems of information). In general, however, three approaches (the standard view, the functionalist view, and that relational view) to moral agency have been identified, proposed, and discussed frequently.³⁾ The paper analyzes them in the following sections and discusses the advantages of the relational approach to artificial moral agent and agentic AI.

Three Approaches to Moral Agency

The notion and the standard of moral agency are understood in three different ways.⁴⁾ The first approach is the standard view, which identifies the ability to make moral decisions and take moral responsibility by laying down specific conditions of being a moral agent (Johnson 2006). According to the standard view, a system with particular inner states (states that are similar to beliefs, desires, and intentions) and their causal efficacy to generate actions can be called an agent. In other words, an agent is a system that believes, desires, chooses, and makes moral decisions and takes responsibility through its actions and decisions. Johnson discusses a list of conditions for being an agent in the following way. "First, there is an agent with an internal state. The internal state consists of desires, beliefs, and other intentional states [...] Together, the intentional states (e.g., a belief that a certain act is possible, a desire to act, plus an intending to act) constitute a reason for acting. Second, there is an outward, embodied event [...] Third, the internal state is the cause of the outward event; that is, the movement of the body is rationally directed at some state of the world. Fourth, the outward behavior (the result of rational direction) has an outward effect."⁵⁾ According to Johnson, a system, to be moral agent, should have inner states that play the roles of beliefs and desires in its moral decisions. However, it is uncertain whether artificial systems have belief- or desire-like states that are used to make moral decisions. Additionally, because of artificial systems' complexity and dynamic variance, it is not clear whether the inner states of artificial systems can be identified.

The second approach is the functionalist view of moral agency. The functionalist view defines agency from the perspective of how a system can act and react to external conditions without specifying the inner states to the level of human psychology.⁶⁾ For example, an agent

is the one who can behave in a particular way in response to her environment to fulfill her goals and objectives. Floridi and Sanders (2004) propose three criteria for moral agency: (1) Interactivity: A system can interact with its environment. (2) Autonomy (Independence): A system can change its states and its interactions independently of immediate external control or influence. (3) Adaptability: A system can change its states and function on the basis of its interaction with its environment.

One of the advantages of this approach, according to Floridi and Sanders (2004), is to avoid anthropocentrism in assessing moral agency and responsibility through inner states, intention, and free will and to discuss an appropriate form of accountability and agenthood of an artificial system on the basis of particular functions and abilities that a moral agent can implement and realize in its interaction with human beings. This is a "mindless morality" where digital beings in Cyberspace and "animals can be considered moral agents without their having to display free will, emotions, or mental states."⁷⁾

However, the functionalist view needs to deal with the responsibility gap. Since the behaviors of artificial systems are not explained by inner states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, their responsibility is not properly attributed to the systems' inner states. Because agency (the quality of being an actor) and responsibility (the quality of being praised or blamed) are not linked via attributability (an inner states are identified for a particular action), the responsibility gap exists in artificial systems. In the context of functionalist view, responsibility is not attributed to particular inner intentional states but functions of systems and there is a gap between agency and responsibility because the system's internal states are not clearly identifiable by the categories of inner intentional states. Because of the computational complexity, human engineers cannot effectively identify causally or morally responsible inner computational states of a system. As a result of this failure in attributability, there are situations where no one is responsible for the wrongdoings of artificial systems. Matthias states that "the manufacturer/operator of the machine is in principle not capable of predicting the future machine behavior anymore and thus cannot be held morally responsible or liable for it."⁸⁾

The third approach is the relational approach. According to the relational approach, robots or AI systems have moral agency, not necessarily because of their cognitive states and functional abilities but because of the way they interact with human beings and support moral and social values. The relational approach focuses on (1) whether and how a system functions in a communal and collaborative environment with human beings and other agents and (2) whether a system can follow and support moral values. Being an agent, in this relation

3) Behdadi and Munthe (2020).

4) Behdadi and Munthe (2020).

5) Johnson (2006, 198).

6) Floridi and Sanders (2006, 198).

7) Floridi and Sanders (2006, 198).

8) Matthias (2004, 175).

context, means knowing how to form an interactive, collaborative relation with human beings and how to support moral norms and values that are beneficial to human beings. In other words, by being members of the moral community and being trustworthy partners, they can be relational and communal agents. This is a non-ontological, non-*a priori*, open, and interactive approach to moral agency, where moral agency of social robots and AI can be explained by their relational and communal nature of moral actions and decisions.

Relationalism refers to this new approach in robot's moral agency, moral standing, and moral rights. It is an open and interactive approach that focuses on how artificial systems interact with human beings in social relational and moral contexts.⁹⁾ In contrast to the property-based approach where a certain group of cognitive and affective properties define the qualities of moral agency or moral standing in isolation, the relational approach brings in the social and interactive dimension of moral agency. Relationalism argues that what matters most is the network of interactions and relations between artificial systems and human beings, not necessarily the cognitive and affective abilities of the system in isolation. Saetra (2021) compares the properties-based approach and relational approach and stresses the importance of the latter in the following way. "Rather than ascribing moral standing on the basis of characteristics of the entity – the properties-based approach – the very fact that we relate with other entities becomes the basis for obligations and claim for moral consideration (Gellers, 2020). As with the traditional types of relational theories, what matters is not necessarily whether or not the others are like us (Darling, 2016), or if we see ourselves reflected in them (Sætra, 2021b), but rather how these others become actors in our social structures with which we interact. ...In robot relationalism, the fact that we relate to robots is taken as an indication that these entities are, in fact, nodes of value due to these relations."¹⁰⁾

Advantages of the Relational Approach to AMA

The three approaches have their advantages and disadvantages in explaining the moral agency of artificial systems, but the relational view has several advantages in explaining the agency and responsibility of artificial systems. Although the standard view and the functionalist view have issues of anthropocentrism (i.e., using the standards of human psychology such as beliefs and desires in identifying and evaluating the moral ability of artificial systems) and the responsibility gap (i.e., the difficulty of explaining the responsibility of artificial systems whose internal functional states are not clearly identified), the relational view has advantages in explaining the agency and responsibility of artificial systems. According to relational view, agency (the cognitive, moral and social qualities of being an agent) is a relational notion that is determined by the interactive relation between artificial systems and human beings. Additionally, the responsibility of moral agents can be explained

9) Coeckelbergh (2010b), Gellers (2020), Gunkel (2018).

10) Saetra (2021, 6).

collectively because agency can be given to a group of individuals who work together in a role specific, communal context. Even though the agency and responsibility of machines can be debatable in isolation, their interaction and collaboration with humans can explain an appropriate form of agency and its responsibility in the context of the collective and collaborative human AI interaction. As a result, shared agency and responsibility can be developed out of the relational viewpoint of artificial moral agency.

Empirical Studies of Moral Agency

The validity and practical significance of relationalism in the context of robotic moral agency and moral responsibility are evidenced by empirical studies of people's perception of robotic agents. It is reported that the mind has two major components (agency and experience [patency]) and people attribute moral agency to artificial systems (such as robots and AI) but assign less ability to feel and experience (Gray et al 2007). In other words, artificial systems can be perceived to be active in their actions and decisions but not active in their experience of feelings and emotions.¹¹⁾ Additionally, in comparison with human beings, artificial systems are not perceived to have consciousness and free will, the two critical components of individual moral agency of human beings (Nahmias et al. 2020). According to people's perception of agency, artificial systems have the intermediate level of agency between human adults and animals/infants.¹²⁾ For this type of quasi-agential systems, punishment does not work to fulfill the purpose of deterrence or retribution (Lima et al. 2021). Nor are these systems aware of their wrongdoings or blames from others because they do not sense or feel these moral or social emotions.

However, artificial systems have a specific type of agency and responsibility, if their actions and decisions are perceived in the context of group collaboration. In other words, people recognize and understand the agency of artificial systems through their group work. If stand alone, their agency is not clearly identified (i.e., only about intermediate level of agency between the agency of human adults and animals, and lacking consciousness and feelings) and responsibility or punishment is less likely to be applicable to their actions. If their actions are understood as collective actions originating from a group, their agency is recognized, and their responsibility is attributed although they are not perceived to have consciousness or free will.

For example, empirical studies of collective agents can support or at least be compatible with the relational view. Several studies on people's perception of art pieces created by the collaboration of human beings and AI systems demonstrate that people perceive the agency of artificial systems as collective partners and understand their work from the perspective

11) Geiselmann et al. (2023), Huebner (2010), Wegner and Gray (2016).

12) Gray et al (2007), Wegner and Gray (2016).

of the collective work of human groups.¹³⁾ These studies report that people typically perceive an artificial system's agency (ability to act and make decisions) in the context of their collective or interactive actions with their collaborative partners (i.e., human beings). In other words, people understand and ascribe agency to an artificial system when they understand the actions of a machine from the perspective of a group or communal agency. In this context, shared responsibility and interactivity with human beings is an important or necessary characteristic of artificial agency.¹⁴⁾ Beyond the standard and the functionalist approaches to moral agency, therefore, relationalism provides a unique notion of agency in the collaborative and collective context of human-machine interaction and can develop a viable notion of artificial moral agent that can be used in AI ethics of moral agency.

Moral Agency in Non-Western Philosophy

From the viewpoint of relationalism, one can go beyond the traditional Western (ontology- or property-based) viewpoint to understand the moral standing of non-human entities and their moral rights. For this reason, relationalism is often regarded as an Eastern worldview, perhaps because of the holistic, collectivist, and interactive orientation of Eastern philosophical traditions such as Confucianism and Buddhism.¹⁵⁾ Because of the collectivist and collaborative framework of moral agency in Confucianism and Buddhism, people in East Asian countries, probably, have better chance to understand, recognize, and accommodate autonomous artificial agents and their collaboration with human beings.¹⁶⁾

In many schools of Western philosophy, moral agency is understood from the perspective of rational understanding and inner moral will against external influences and contingencies. Perhaps, the best example of this type of moral agency can be found in Kantian moral philosophy. At the center of Kantian philosophy, one can find a notion of moral agent through autonomy and moral will. According to Kant, a voluntary and self-conscious action committed by an individual based on her universal and rational principles is autonomous and an action carries a moral value if it is committed by the actor's moral will.¹⁷⁾

However, there are different forms of moral agency. In contrast to Kantian or traditional approach to moral agency, one can develop an alternative model of moral agency.¹⁸⁾ One's own self, person, or agency can be understood broadly as open and integrative processes of interaction between the self and its social and physical environments. For example, Confucian

moral philosophy develops this type of moral agency from the perspective of the relational and role specific self. One can find many passages of classical Confucian texts regarding the interpersonal, relational and role specific nature of the moral self and virtue. According to Confucius, one should always think of one's relation to others and take care of others in one's cultivation of the ideal moral self. Confucius also talks about fulfilling a particular social role one should serve (Analects, 12.11) to become a virtuous moral agent. Regarding this relational and interactive nature of the Confucian self or Confucian person, Ames develops a unique notion of self and person. He (Ames 1994) states that a person is "an undetermined range and locus of experiences expressed through specific roles and relationships."¹⁹⁾

In the context of the role and relation specific notion of Confucian moral agency, Zhu and colleagues (2020) state that "...a morally competent robot would be one that is capable of acting well the contextualized responsibilities specified by the role(s) and associated relationships assigned to the robot."²⁰⁾ Following this line of relational thinking, Kim and Strudler (2023) argue that assigning role obligations to robots is a good way to understand and regulate artificial moral agents. They state that the Confucian notion of robotic agency "is superior to the robot-rights perspective because, rather than being adversarial, it is team encouraging..."²¹⁾ If Kim and Strudler's relationship-based approach to robot ethics is superior to the rule-based approach of deontology (i.e., the rule and autonomy based approach to moral agency), Confucian ethics has a good chance to become an inspiring paradigm of AMA. The notion of relational agency and the notion of Confucian moral agent can provide a useful and practical model for AI ethics and AMA, specifically in the context of the relational viewpoint of artificial moral agency and responsibility. The author believes that the future of artificial moral agent depends on relational and collectivist notions of moral agent that is supported by the non-Western views (rational and collection notions) of moral agent.

Conclusion

The paper discussed three approaches to moral agency: the standard view, functionalist view, and relational view. The relational view, compared with the standard view and the functionalist view, provides a promising explanation of the moral agency of AI and it can promote collaborative human AI interaction and coexistence. The moral agency of an artificial system can be understood clearly in interactive, collaborative contexts where the system and human users collaborate for their common goals. According to the relational view, AI or robotic systems have moral agency, not simply because of their cognitive states and functional abilities but because of the way they interact and collaborate with human beings and the way they support moral values and norms. This is a non-ontological, non-a

13) Kay et al., (2018), Fisher et al. (2021), Mikalonyte and Kneer (2022).

14) Floridi (2016), List (2021).

15) Saetra (2021, 6).

16) Song (2020, 2021).

17) Kant (1996, 535, G6.407).

18) Seok (2017) discusses the notion of communal agency in the context of Confucian communo-nomy in contrast to autonomy of moral agency.

19) Ames (1994, 198).

20) Zhu and colleagues (2020, 6).

21) Kim and Strudler (2023, 85).

priori, open, and interactive approach to moral agency that promotes collaborative human-computer interaction and coexistence. The relational view has advantages over other theories of artificial moral agent because of its open, relational and collective approach that can avoid the philosophical issues of anthropocentrism and the responsibility gap. It helps us understand the nature of artificial agency, moral responsibility of AI, and human AI interaction in the context of autonomous AI and robotic systems. It will stimulate an innovative way to educate people, specifically in the context of AI education and AI literacy, to understand what AI is, how to build AI, how to train AI, and how to use AI and for ethical purposes. Additionally, the relational view is compatible with empirical studies of agency and closely related to the notions of moral agency in non-Western philosophy such as Confucianism.

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문유미

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Abstract

In contemplating the future of Asian coexistence, it is valuable to revisit how ideas of Asian cooperation and co-prosperity were articulated and practiced over the past century. Among the many strands of Pan-Asianism that emerged in East Asia, this paper examines its manifestations in the final years of the Second World War, from 1943 to 1945. While Pan-Asianism had long been a strand of Japan's imperial rhetoric, it was reinvigorated and given enhanced attention after Japan's military setbacks following the Midway and Guadalcanal campaigns. Reassessing their military and diplomatic strategies, Japanese leaders sought peace negotiations with China, endeavored to preserve the Soviet Union's neutrality in Asia, and expanded the visions of Greater East Asia to counter the political influence of Allied propaganda articulated in the Atlantic Charter. This study focuses on three prominent Japanese leaders of the time—Shigemitsu Mamoru (Foreign Minister), Koiso Kuniaki (Governor-General of Korea and later Prime Minister), and Ugaki Kazushige (former Minister of War and Governor-General of Korea)—, explores how their conceptions of Asia and Korea evolved amid shifting wartime strategies and the growing recognition of Japan's impending defeat.

In reflecting on the coexistence of Asia, it is important to understand how the ideas of Asian cooperation and co-prosperity were articulated and practiced over the past century. Japan employed Pan-Asianism to challenge the traditional relationships among East Asian countries and to assert its authority and leadership in reforming Asia. The early discourse of Pan-Asianism introduced the ideas of enlightenment and established a new hierarchy among Asian countries by portraying Qing China and Chosŏn Korea as "backward" objects of Japan's "civilizing mission." At the turn of the twentieth century, some Korean and Chinese intellectuals admired Meiji Japan's modern transformation and expected its constructive role in reforming their own countries and defending them against Western encroachments, including that of Russia. Yet, such progressive aspirations of Pan-Asianists were soon shattered when Japan established a protectorate over Korea following the Russo-Japanese War and eventually annexed it in 1910. This early phase of Pan-Asianism came to a close when An Chung-gŭn, a Pan-Asianist and Korean patriot, assassinated Itō Hirobumi, Japan's Resident-General in Korea, at Harbin in retribution for Itō's betrayal of Asian peace.

Japan reinvigorated Pan-Asianism as it waged war against China and the United States. Although multiple strands of Pan-Asianism emerged during this wartime period, this paper focuses on its manifestations in the final years of the Second World War, from 1943 to 1945. Following the setbacks at the Battle of Midway and, more decisively, Japan's defeat in the Guadalcanal Campaign, Japanese leaders sought to reorient their wartime strategies, readjust Japan's relationship with Asia, and counter the political impacts of Allied propaganda articulated in the Atlantic Charter. This paper examines the ideas of three prominent Japanese figures, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Koiso Kuniaki, and Ugaki Kazushige, to understand Japan's wartime discourse on Asia and Korea and how their perspectives shifted amid the growing prospect of Japan's defeat. Shigemitsu was appointed Foreign Minister in April 1943, soon after Japan's loss at Guadalcanal (August 1942–February 1943). AS foreign minister, Shigemitsu redirected Japan's diplomacy toward negotiating peace with the Chinese Nationalists, maintaining Soviet neutrality in Asia, and strengthening the political reach of the Great East Asian Co-prosperity across Asia. Koiso Kuniaki ruled Korea as the governor-general from 1943 to 1944 and succeeded Tōjō Hideki in July 1944 as Japan's final prime minister before its surrender. Ugaki Kazushige, who had previously served as Minister of War, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Governor-General of Korea (April 1927 to July 1929; June 1931 to January 1937) was known for his conflicts with military hardliners. During the war's final years, he wrote a series of essays assessing Japan's overall position in the war and proposing policy recommendations. The writings of Shigemitsu, Koiso, and Ugaki between 1943 and 1945 reveal how Japan modified its rhetoric and policies toward Asia and how its leaders swiftly and expediently withdrew the wartime discourse of Pan Asianism as they sought to redeem and rebuild "a new Japan" in the aftermath of defeat.

Shigemitsu Mamoru:

Peace Negotiations with China and Neutrality of the USSR

Shigemitsu Mamoru served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from April 1943 to April 1945 and concurrently held the position of Minister of Greater East Asia from July 1944 to April 1945. He was reappointed as Foreign Minister between August and September 1945, overseeing Japan's negotiations with the Allied Powers to conclude the Second World War. Shigemitsu is remembered for his opposition to Japan's entry into the Axis alliance and the war against the United States, as well as for his efforts to bring the conflict to an early end. However, Suzuki Teiichi, who served as a Minister of State and originally proposed the creation of the Ministry of Greater East Asia, wrote in his wartime recollections that, although Shigemitsu recognized the urgent need to end the war, he refrained from taking the initiative to persuade the Army and Navy to accept such a course.¹⁾ Shigemitsu is also known to Koreans as one of the high-ranking Japanese officials targeted by Yun Pong-gil, a Korean patriot affiliated with the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, who carried out a bombing in Hongkou Park on April 29, 1932. Shigemitsu lost his leg in the attack.

The Shigemitsu Mamoru Collection, housed in the National Diet Library of Japan, contains top-secret papers that illuminate the perspectives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry under Shigemitsu's leadership. Japan's defeats at Midway and Guadalcanal marked the end of its rapid military expansion in Southeast Asia following Pearl Harbor and paved the way for the U.S. counteroffensive in the Pacific. While Japan continued to invoke Pan-Asianism as a rhetorical justification of its imperial expansion, it was only after its position in the war began to deteriorate that the Japanese government, at the level of official diplomacy, articulated the concrete details of the Greater East Asia. In this shifting context, Shigemitsu Mamoru advanced a "new policy" that prioritized peace negotiations with the Chongqing government and the maintenance of Soviet neutrality in Asia.²⁾

Shigemitsu's appointment as Foreign Minister clearly signaled a major diplomatic shift to both Chinese and Westerners. Japan's Special Higher Police monitored the reactions of Chinese and Westerners in China to his new post. In Shanghai, business leaders interpreted his appointment as Japan's intention to seek a truce with the Chongqing government. Given Shigemitsu's favorable reputation in Western countries, some speculated that Japan might even pursue a separate peace in the Second World War. Observers also noted his previous efforts as ambassador in Nanjing to improve relations with Chongqing and his personal friendship with Song Ziwen (T.V. Soong), the Chongqing Foreign Minister. They suggested that Shigemitsu would now try to complete what he had begun in China. However, business leaders in Shanghai believed that the central obstacles lay in Manchuria. They predicted

that Japan might make extensive concessions to secure peace with China but would never compromise its control over Manchuria. They also argued that the Soviet Union should offer substantive—not merely formal—recognition of Japan's dominance in Manchuria, despite Moscow's own strategic interests there.³⁾

In contrast, Chinese political elites in Shanghai did not regard Shigemitsu's appointment as an effort to resolve the China question. They argued that Shigemitsu's ties with Chinese leaders were limited and that his diplomatic expertise lay in Western affairs. These observers contended that Japan sought a flexible approach toward the Soviet Union while carefully monitoring the war situation in Europe and German-Soviet front. Following Japan's defeat at Guadalcanal, Shigemitsu's rise symbolized the growing influence of specialists in Anglo-American relations within the Japanese government, as well as its determination to coordinate its diplomatic and military strategies. These Chinese observers, likely associated with Wang Jingwei's Nanjing regime, downplayed the possibility of a truce between Japan and the Chongqing Nationalists.⁴⁾

Meanwhile, the Japanese police also recorded Western reactions in the Shanghai's International Settlement to Shigemitsu's appointment. Germans interpreted it as Japan's attempt to strengthen its diplomacy with the Soviet Union and forestall any separate German-Soviet peace. To this end, Tokyo appeared intent on pursuing non-aggression pacts with the USSR, China, and Manchukuo, a task they viewed Shigemitsu as well suited to handle. The Soviets, meanwhile, saw Tōjō Hideki's cabinet reshuffle as preparation for a "decisive war." They understood Shigemitsu's mission as resolving the "China problem," the "central issue of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," through consolidating the Nanjing regime and promoting Chinese unity. Compared with his pro-German predecessor Tani Masayuki, Shigemitsu was seen as a pragmatic diplomat solely motivated by Japan's national interests. The Soviets thus welcomed his appointment, anticipating closer Russo-Japanese relations.⁵⁾

As aptly anticipated in those reactions, Shigemitsu's diplomacy indeed focused on the Soviet Union and peace negotiations with China. A confidential report dated in October 1943 analyzed the USSR's wartime objectives. Distinguishing between the Soviet Union's immediate wartime goals and its long-term aims, it defined the USSR's direct objective as the liberation of its homeland, the destruction of Nazism, and the emancipation of ethnic groups under German domination. The report explained that the "homeland" referred to the territorial boundary the USSR maintained at the outbreak of the war in June 1941—which

1) Suzuki Teiichi Bunsho, no. 66 & 67, The National Diet Library of Japan.

2) Shigemitsu Mamoru Bunsho, no. 1084, February 1943, The National Diet Library of Japan.

3) Shigemitsu Mamoru Bunsho, no. 1085, May 1, 1943.

4) Ibid.

5) Shigemitsu Mamoru Bunsho, no. 1086, May 5, 1943.

means, the frontier established after its 1939–40 territorial expansions.⁶⁾ Arguing that the USSR would seek the full restoration of these territories, the report questioned whether Britain and the United States would accept such demands. Regarding East Asia, the report assessed that the USSR maintained a neutral stance toward Japan. However, viewing the Greater East Asia War as part of its global anti-fascist struggle, the USSR's goal in Asia was essentially the same as its position toward Germany: the elimination of fascism and the restoration of a "Soviet-style democracy." Therefore, the report warned, Japan should not regard Soviet policy as neutral or underestimate Soviet ambitions in East Asia.⁷⁾

Several confidential reports titled "Political Overview of the War (Chōngguk kaegwan)" assessed the war's progress and offered diplomatic recommendations for Japan.⁸⁾ The report dated May 13, 1943, analyzed the Tunisian Campaign and the Allied victory in North Africa, emphasizing its global implications. It observed that the victory freed three to four million tons of Allied naval shipping capacity, enabling the UK and the US to plan a second front in Europe and intensify their offensive against Japan in the Pacific. The report warned that the defeat in Tunisia would have grave consequences, influence the decisions of various Asian nations after observing how the war progressed and how the relative situations of the Allied and Axis powers developed. The report wrote,

*"The defeat in Tunisia was a critical event since the outbreak of the war. Along with the unexpected outcome in Stalingrad, the result in Tunisia would have grave consequences. The enemy would take exploit the divisions and gaps among Asian nations and conduct active and relentless propaganda to alienate them from Japan. We must take this fully into account."*⁹⁾

The overview stressed the strategic importance of Japan's occupied Asian territories as the rear base of its military front. It called for Japan to secure "voluntary and autonomous" cooperation from states such as Thailand and to implement the "new policy" swiftly and comprehensively. As the Allies presented themselves as protectors of small nations and champions of freedom, Japan needed to apply this new policy to undermine such propaganda and consolidate Japan's position in Asia.¹⁰⁾ These documents reveal that Japan's vigorous promotion of Pan-Asianism arose from its weakening position in the war. Japan established the Ministry of Great East Asia in November 1942 during the Guadalcanal Campaign and pursued "the new policy" more assertively after the Allied victory in North Africa in May 1943.¹¹⁾

6) Shigemitsu Mamoru Bunsho, no. 1100, October 1, 1943.

7) Ibid.

8) Shigemitsu Mamoru Bunsho, no. 1457, May 12, 1943.

9) Ibid.

10) Ibid.

11) Shigemitsu Mamoru Bunsho, no. 1457, May 13, 1943.

The overview dated July 1943 affirmed Japan's firm commitment to advancing the Greater East Asia project. It noted that Allied offensives had achieved major political gains. Following the Casablanca conference, the Allies declared the policy of "unconditional surrender" for the Axis powers and outlined a postwar order based on the Atlantic Charter, in which the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China would disarm the Axis, establish international tribunals, and create global military, policing, and financial institutions. The report emphasized that Japan should not only maintain its existing military frontline but also prepare to repel enemy offensives approaching the borders of the Greater East Asia. At the 82nd extraordinary session of the Diet, Japan resolved to wage the "decisive war" and sought to unite Asian nations under the banner of Greater East Asia. Prime Minister Tōjō announced the specific policies for this goal; Foreign Minister Shigemitsu elaborated on them in his Diet address. To demonstrate "voluntary and autonomous cooperation" among Asian nations, Japan invited regional leaders including Indian independence fighter Subhas Chandra Bose to the Greater East Asian Conference (Taedonga Hoeüi) held in November 1943, where it proclaimed the Charter of Great East Asia (Taedonga Hōnjang) in the name of Asian "liberation" and cooperation.¹²⁾

Finally, the Soviet Union was another, perhaps the most important, focus of Shigemitsu's new diplomacy. Several reports in his collection advised Japan to avoid any manipulation by the Allied propaganda regarding the USSR and to revise its stance toward Yan'an and the Chinese Communists to improve relations with Moscow.¹³⁾ Japanese analysts assessed Allied operations as steady and methodical: after securing their rear areas, the British and Americans advanced in a highly organized manner. Any counter-offensive against Japan, they predicted, would not be a surprise strike but a systematic campaign launched from well-prepared bases such as Australia, India, Hawaii, and the Aleutians. They also identified a difference in Allied priorities—the British focusing exclusively on Europe, as reaffirmed at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, while the Americans placed greater emphasis on the Pacific fronts.¹⁴⁾

Given this European priority, Japanese analysts concluded that the Allies would postpone major operations against Japan, allowing time for Tokyo to build and consolidate the Greater East Asian Sphere. They believed that once Japan consolidated its strategic status in Asia, it would be very difficult to defeat. Their predictions rested on optimistic assessments of Germany's capacity to overcome its difficulties in Europe. The reports argued that the Allies were unlikely to open a second front soon, citing Germany's strengthened defenses from Normandy to Balkans and its confidence in repelling an Allied landing. They further claimed

12) Shigemitsu Mamoru Bunsho, no. 1465, July 6, 1943.

13) Shigemitsu Mamoru Bunsho, no. 1457, May 13, 1943.

14) Shigemitsu Mamoru Bunsho, no. 1462, May 27, 1943.

that, supported by its secure rear areas, Germany intended to launch a new offensive against the Soviet Union from the Near East. Referring to Churchill's speech in May 1943 about the problems of the prolonged war and the need to shorten the war, Japanese analysts interpreted it as a sign that the Allies tried to end the conflict quickly by drawing the Soviet Union into the war in Asia.¹⁵⁾

Based on such assessments, the reports recommended that Japan pursue diplomatic measures to satisfy the USSR's territorial ambition, proposing that Moscow gain access to the sea in the West rather than in the East. As Germany's position deteriorated, this approach appeared increasingly feasible. Japan paid close attention to the Soviet announcement in Pravda on May 22, 1943, dissolving the Comintern. Although described as one of Russia's "deceitful" tactics, Japanese analysts assessed that the move would produce complex effects. By renouncing Comintern leadership, the USSR signaled its intentions to end direct control over communist movements. This eased Soviet relations with the Allies, reducing Western fears of communist expansion. It also weakened Germany's propaganda and fostered optimism about the USSR's postwar role.¹⁶⁾

A top-secret document titled "On the Soviet Problem" further advised Japan to press Germany to grant the USSR access to the Mediterranean. Japan regarded accommodating Soviet territorial ambitions as essential for preserving Soviet neutrality in Asia. Referring to Molotov's 1940 visit to Berlin, the report cited Soviet claims to Bessarabia, Bulgaria, and the Dardanelles, as well as ambitions in Manchuria, Northern China, and southern Sakhalin. Although the United States and Britain shared opposition to Germany, they were unlikely to accept Soviet dominance in Europe. As Germany's military position deteriorated, making peace with Moscow seemed its only viable course by late 1943. Japanese analysts speculated that satisfying Molotov's earlier demands might spark tensions between the USSR and the Anglo-Americans, ultimately benefiting Germany. If Hitler rejected this possibility, Japan believed it must act diplomatically to encourage such an arrangement, recognizing that Soviet access to the seas, whether in the West or East, would decisively affect Japan's imperial interests.¹⁷⁾

In short, the top-secret documents in the Shigemitsu collection reveal Japan's diplomatic strategies in 1943, formulated in response to its worsening military position and the Allied advance in the Pacific. Japan's new policy centered on three main objectives: achieving peace with China, consolidating the political and economic foundations of Greater East Asia,

15) Ibid.

16) Ibid.

17) Shigemitsu Mamoru Bunsho, no. 1467, August 22, 1943.

and preventing Soviet entry into the war in Asia.¹⁸⁾ Peace with China was deemed essential to shorten Japan's frontlines and resolve contradiction between its war policy and the proclaimed ideals of Greater East Asia. Japan pledged to withdraw its troops from China after a truce and sought to reconcile the Nanjing and Chongqing regimes. Japanese leaders believed that peace in China would help them manage the risk of Soviet intervention. At the same time, maintaining Soviet neutrality remained crucial. Japan therefore tried to avoid any minor conflicts with Moscow and to moderate its hostility toward communist movements in Asia. In Europe, Japan aimed to persuade Germany to grant the USSR access to the Mediterranean, hoping to create rifts between the Soviets and the Anglo-American powers. To counter Allied propaganda, Japan promoted its war as the "liberation" of Asia and presented the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity as a legitimate regional order. Yet this message was undermined by Japan's continued colonial domination of Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria. The Cairo Declaration of November 1943 dealt a severe blow to Japan's diplomacy by affirming support for Korean independence and the return of Chinese territories seized by Japan.

Koiso Kuniaki: The Decisive War and the Racial Integration of the Imperial Nation

The relatively rational assessments in the Japanese Foreign Ministry's reports took on a different tone when translated into colonial policies and specific goals for human and material mobilizations. The wartime condition of the colonies, as well as their position within Japan's Greater East Asia, are shown in the records of colonial administrators and settlers. By 1943, Japan characterized the war as the "decisive war (kyōlchōn)" and issued the "Outline for National Administration" to reorganize the government and to accelerate mobilization. In accordance with this directive, colonial officials in Korea further defined the peninsula's practical role in the war effort. The "Outline" and its implementation in Korea reveal a series of frantic, ad-hoc, adjustments within the colonial administration and a devolution of power from the center to local officials and civilians to meet the urgent demands of the "decisive war." Governor-General Koiso Kuniaki, who served in Korea between 1942 and 1944, oversaw mobilization for this final stage of the war. Koiso promoted the idea of racial integration between Koreans and Japanese, based on a colonial theory of their shared ancestry. Whether sincerely held or used merely as a mobilizing tool, Koiso urged the Japanese to treat Koreans as their "ethnic brethren (tongp'o)." While suppressing the discussions of Korean freedom and equality, he justified this rhetoric of racial unity as a wartime necessity to secure Korea's human and material resources.

18) In defining Japan's new diplomatic mission, the Foreign Ministry emphasized diplomacy as vital both to supporting Japan's precarious military situation and to securing ultimate victory. Its priorities were to weaken the enemy's war potential, sow discord among the enemies, strengthen Japan's own standing, and preserve close relations within the Axis. The Allies justified their cause as resistance to aggression, the protection of small nations, and the defense of democracy. To counter this, Japan should introduce a new policy recasting the Greater East Asia project not as conquest but as "liberation." The Foreign Ministry stressed that China should be central to this policy, both to affirm the empire's "just" war aims and blunt the Allies' diplomatic appeal. Paradoxically, it portrayed the Greater East Asia's economy as founded on free trade and reciprocity, while accusing the Allies of monopolizing resources within a closed system. Shigemitsu Mamoru Bunsho, no. 1467, August 22, 1943

Japan's defeats at Midway and Guadalcanal not only revived the rhetoric of Greater East Asia but also forced recognition of the United States' overwhelming industrial capacity and Japan's own material vulnerability. The idea of "a decisive war (kyōlchōn)" emerged from this acute awareness of imbalance. To address it, Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki issued "The Outline of National Administration (kukchōng unyōng taegang)," which aimed to strengthen Japan's war effort by maximizing human and material resources across the empire to increase "direct war power." In these final years of the war, Korea assumed growing importance within Japan's mobilization system. Colonial officials emphasized Korea's potential to expand "direct war power", citing its large population and abundant mineral resources. This line of thinking appeared prominently in a special feature by in the *Asahi Simbun*. This coverage included discussions among Japanese officials and experts working in Korea and managing Korean workers. The articles were published as a booklet in July 1944. The reporter described this coverage as an effort to deepen understanding of Japan's "Korean brethren" and to change Japanese perceptions of them. He asserted that unless the Japanese could embrace their twenty-five million "Korean brethren" in unity, they should abandon any illusion of successfully building the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.¹⁹⁾

Koiso's interview appeared in the *Asahi Simbun* feature. He argued that the Japanese had long been indifferent to Korea, distracted by the empire's expansion into territories such as Manchuria and Southeast Asia. This indifference, he stated, reflected ignorance of Korea's contribution to the war; the discrimination and harsh treatments of Koreans created obstacles to recruiting Koreans effectively. Drawing on colonial narratives of ancient history, Koiso argued that Koreans and Japanese shared common ancestral origins and their "backwardness" in modern times stemmed from the failures of the Korean monarchy. Since the Japanese annexation, he asserted, Koreans had been set back on the path of "progress" and were now prepared to form a unified national body with the Japanese people. Participants in the conference likewise emphasized the need for more humane treatment of Korean laborers in mines and factories. They said that Koreans made up the major workforce in mining but recently avoided such work due to the harsh treatments and discrimination. One participant even suggested that Japanese managers learn basic Korean phrases to facilitate better communication. The discussion also underscored Japan's growing reliance on Korean rice. As Allied bombings reduced Japan's shipping capacity, most of it diverted to military use, the supply routes connecting Manchuria, Korea, and the Japanese archipelago became Japan's chief source of food and grain by mid-1944.²⁰⁾

The materials in the Yuho Bunko collection provide important insight into Korea's wartime conditions. Among them, *Chosŏn Silŏp*, a magazine written by colonial officials and settler

19) Chosŏn Tongp'o e Koham, July 1944, Taedongasa in Yūhō Bunko, no. 049-9, Gakushūin University
20) Ibid.

elites, served as a platform for articulating wartime agendas. Its January 1943 issue reflected the growing anxiety among the Japanese following the defeats in the Pacific. In his New Year's message, Governor-General Koiso Kuniaki described the war as having entered the stage of the "decisive war," which would determine the empire's ultimate fate. He called it a "total, decisive, and cruel war," one that would decide the empire's survival or collapse.²¹⁾ Tanaka Takeo, the political governor of colonial Korea, also declared 1943 the year of the "decisive war." While expressing confidence in Japan's military strength, he warned that complacency among those behind the front lines could lead to unpredictable setbacks and national disgrace. The colonial government announced the military conscription of Koreans beginning in 1944 and the introduction of compulsory education in 1946. Tanaka portrayed these policies as a "historic opportunity" for Koreans to discipline themselves as true imperial subjects. He exhorted Koreans to treat the decisive war as a "valuable occasion for self-cultivation"—a means to refine their minds and become "leading members (chidojōk kungmin) of Greater East Asia."²²⁾

A settler author named Suzuki Takeo, a professor at Keijō Imperial University, wrote on the war's direction and Korea's role in it. Acknowledging the immense industrial capacity of the United States, he argued that the conflict entered a stage of "protracted war (changgiŏn)."²³⁾ Unlike government officials who framed the conflict as a "decisive war," Suzuki contended that the Allies sought to impose this phase to hasten the war's end. Given the imbalance in production, Japan could not hope for a swift victory and would need to endure a prolonged struggle that continuously drained resources and energy. Citing an army spokesperson's analogy, he described the "protracted nature of the Greater East Asian War" not as a simple marathon but a marathon-huddle race demanding daily effort, full strength, and endurance. Still, Suzuki argued that U.S. production had already peaked and would eventually decline. Once the Greater East Asian Sphere was realized, Japan's position would be strengthened. Until then, improving production remained the highest priority, and any obstacle to that goal should be corrected. He called for unity among all groups, between labor and business, Koreans and Japanese, and the government and the people, under the idea of a family state (*kajok kukka*), to sustain Japan's resistance against its enemies.

Suzuki wrote an article titled "The Outline of National Administration" and the role of the Korean peninsula.²⁴⁾ This article is useful to understand how the "Outline" and its implementation changed colonial administration in Korea in the final years of the war. Suzuki compared the "Outline" with "The Basic Essentials of the Government Policies" announced by the second

21) Koiso Kuniaki, "Ichioku kotogotoku kessen ni tatsu," in Chōsen Jitsugyō, January, 1943 in Yūhō Bunko, Gakushūin University
22) Tanaka Takeo, "Yuil Chōlidae ūi Sindo," in Chōsen Jitsugyō, January, 1943 in Yūhō Bunko, Gakushūin University
23) Suzuki Takeo, "Chapkijang," in Chōsen Jitsugyō, January, 1943 in Yūhō Bunko, Gakushūin University
24) Suzuki Takeo, "Kukchōng Unyōng Taegang kwo Pando," Chōsen Jitsugyō, October, 1943 in Yūhō Bunko, Gakushūin University

Konoe cabinet in August 1940.” While both plans aimed to build an “advanced military state (kodo kukpang sasang),” they reflected different historical contexts. “The Basic Essentials” was designed to transition Japan from the Manchurian incident to the system for the Sino-Japanese War; it was more theoretical and long-term in scope. In contrast, the “Outline of National Administration” was a wartime measure intended to meet the demands for the decisive stage of the war. It is temporary, urgent, and highly practical for the war. Therefore, the Outline did not allow room for any debates but demand speedy implementations of urgent policies. Suzuki described the “Outline” as an instruction to integrate the supreme command (t’ongsu) and national defense without any gaps (?), transforming domestic structures to meet wartime needs and to pursue active diplomacy accordingly. Its domestic component, the “policies to strengthen the domestic condition for the war (kungnae t’aese kanghwa pangch’aek”, required both government officials and civilians to internalize the mission of the war and dedicate their utmost loyalty and sincerity to the state. Among material and spiritual elements, Suzuki emphasized that the spiritual, defined as loyalty to the Emperor, was the foundation of Japan’s wartime strength.²⁵⁾

Suzuki explained that at this decisive war stage, strengthening Japan’s war power did not mean general expansion but the urgent reinforcement of direct war capacity. Direct war power referred, in terms of human resources, to soldiers and laborers in military production; and as for material resources, to weapons such as battleships, fighter planes, firearms, and ammunitions as well as essential minerals like coal, non-ferocious metals, and other raw materials and food necessary to sustain human war power. Strengthening state administration thus meant rapidly converting all indirect and latent resources into direct military capacity. A key aspect of domestic preparation, he emphasized, was achieving “absolute” food autonomy through the supply network linking Japan and Manchuria. Because food was vital to sustaining the population and military, Japan could not rely on the Greater East Asia for self-sufficiency. Instead, it had to secure food production and transport within Japan, its nearby colonies, and Manchuria. Suzuki estimated that shipping six million bags of rice from Southeast Asia to Japan would require one million tons of vessels-capacity that, if used for bauxite transport, could produce aluminum sufficient to manufacture 25000 airplanes. Hence, securing food self-sufficiency through the Japan-Manchuria supply line itself constituted a major enhancement of Japan’s direct war power.²⁶⁾

In terms of administrative reform, Koiso emphasized restructuring the lower tiers of local government, particularly through the appointment of heavyweight county heads (*taemul myŏnjang*), which became a defining feature of his administration. In mobilizing human resources, Suzuki argued that Korea’s labor force was far more adaptable (and more readily

available) than Japan’s. Military conscription, the recruitment of special naval volunteers, the dispatch of laborers to Japan, and the placement of workers in Korea’s key industries were all hastily implemented to consume Korea’s human resources to strengthen Japan’s direct war power.²⁷⁾

In short, Japan and the colonial government introduced a series of new policies and mobilization drives in Korea with a clear and unwavering goal: to channel Korea’s human and material resources into the expansion of direct war power. As Japan’s control over Southeast Asia faltered and the Allied Forces decimated its naval fleet, the supply route connecting Japan and Manchuria through Korea grew ever more vital. Despite wartime rhetoric of national unity and racial integration, the overriding priority remained the maximization of direct war capacity. Japan’s deteriorating military position and material base made more inclusive discourses conceivable yet rendered them overtly instrumental to wartime mobilization. The coercive and discriminatory mobilization of materials and labor ultimately undermined the colonial gesture of unity and reform, especially at a moment when alternative political visions beyond the Japanese empire were beginning to emerge.

Ugaki Kazushige:

From the Salvation of Empire to the Preservation of the Japanese Nation

Ugaki Kazushige no longer held any official government or military position in the 1940s. However, he remained a significant figure within Japan’s military and political circles. As a former army leader and governor-general of Korea, he continued to correspond with Japanese authorities and wrote numerous essays seeking to influence Japan’s wartime and postwar policies. He marked some of his manuscripts as “top-secret” and individually numbered them, such as “one of three” copies, indicating that they were circulated among select recipients. In October 1944, Ugaki undertook official travels to Korea, Manchuria, and China and wrote several reports that evaluated wartime conditions in those regions and offered policy recommendations. This mission likely presented one of Japan’s final attempts to salvage the empire. His writings from 1943 to 1945 reveal how he radically redefined Japan’s relationship with Asia, withdrew the wartime rhetoric of Pan-Asianism, and made abrupt transitions aimed to safeguard the Japanese nation itself. In these papers, Ugaki envisioned the reconstruction of a post-war Japan through renewed engagement with the West and inviting Western capital and technology. Confronted Japan’s impending defeat and the Allied invasion of the archipelago, Ugaki devoted his efforts to stop the idea of the “suicide resistance” (*ilŏk okswae*). He recommended the government negotiate immediate peace with the Allies in order to preserve the Yamato nation and to protect the imperial institution (*kokutaŭ*), regarding all other concerns as secondary and expendable.

25) Ibid.

26) Ibid.

27) Ibid.

In early August 1942, two months after the Battle of Midway, Ugaki foresaw that Japan's war in Asia would become prolonged and that its greatest challenge would be a shortage of materials. He believed that Japan should immediately pursue a peace treaty with China to avert the defeat, an idea that likely informed Shigemitsu's diplomatic initiatives in mid-1943.²⁸⁾ Ugaki also regarded food procurement for the Japanese population in the home islands as the most critical issue for sustaining the war. He demanded that the Japanese military fight to death in defense of the Japan Strait, the vital route for food transportation. His preoccupation with food supplies reflected his overriding concern with protecting the Yamato nation and preventing famine in the archipelago. For Ugaki, a stable food supply formed a baseline for Japan's military strength and wartime production. He described Japan's food and resource procurement as a relay chain spanning the empire; Japan obtained provisions from Korea and Manchuria; Manchuria from northern China; northern China from southern China; southern China from French Indochina and Thailand, which, in turn, received resources from the South Pacific. Ugaki recommended tighter management of this imperial network to ensure the efficient collection and transport of resources.²⁹⁾ By 1944, as previously noted, this supply chain had been narrowed to a lifeline linking only Manchuria, Korea, and Japan.

In October 1944, Ugaki traveled to Korea, Manchuria, and China to assess local wartime conditions and explore Japan's remaining options for preserving the empire. Military aircraft were arranged for his route from Tokyo to Seoul (Keijō) and Pyōngyang of Korea, Xinjing (Changchun), the capital of Manchukuo, and onward to Beijing and other Japan occupied areas in central and southern China. During the trip, he met with Governor-General Abe Nobuyuki in Korea, senior officials of Manchukuo, cabinet members of the pro-Japanese Chinese government, as well as local business and intellectual figures. In his reports, Ugaki expressed confidence in Korea's stability and its "progress" as a strategic base for Japan's expansion in Asia and its broader mission of "developing" the continent. Regarding Manchuria, he emphasized Japan's investment of vast resources and labor into the region, evaluating the results as largely commensurate with Japan's heavy commitment. He praised Manchuria's good security situation and its vital role as the empire's supply base for food, military materials, and fuel. Yet Ugaki also raised concern over the attitudes of the local population. While Manchukuo's emperor and the prime minister remained devoted to Japan's war effort, Ugaki sensed a general sentiment among the population that Japan's defeat was inevitable. Although they did not necessarily desire Japan's downfall, they appeared resigned and complacent, adopting a "man man di" (no hurry) attitude toward Japan's victory. Despite these misgivings, Ugaki concluded his tour with emotional reassurance, convinced that both Korea and Manchuria were capable and prepared to fulfil their wartime missions.³⁰⁾

28) Ugaki Bunsho, no. 217, August 1942, The National Diet Library of Japan.

29) Ugaki Bunsho, no. 234 (check).

30) Ugaki Bunsho, no. 264 & no. 268.

In northern China, Ugaki met military officers, diplomats, businessmen and youth leaders, and was struck by the grim reality he encountered. Compared to the Manchurian leaders, these Chinese elites held a far more pessimistic outlook on the war. Most anticipated Japan's eventual defeat and appeared psychologically prepared to accept it. While Ugaki believed that few actively desired Japan's downfall, he recognized that some did. Overall, attitudes toward Japan were tepid at best. He estimated that Japan could not expect their cooperation in the empire's decisive battles against the Allies. He also reported severe security deterioration in the region. Traffic accidents and labor strikes were frequent, and transportation routes were congested with both people and goods. Despite the availability of resources, factories suffered from labor shortages as workers fled their posts. Ugaki observed that the population at large distrusted the pro-Japanese Chinese government. Conditions in central China, his next destination, proved even more discouraging. Chinese attitudes toward Japan there were colder and more detached, ranging from skepticism about Japan's victory to complete indifference. Ugaki again concluded that organizing a joint campaign with the Chinese against the Allies would be nearly impossible. The security situation was equally precarious, as communist guerrillas continued to expand their influence among local populations. Yet, he acknowledged that this region possessed more abundant human and material resources than northern China. If Japan were to adopt effective policies, he suggested, these resources might still be harnessed to support Japan's war effort after a peace settlement (hwap'yong). Ugaki closed his report by once again emphasizing the need for peace negotiations with China.³¹⁾

Ugaki set forth his recommendations for achieving a peace settlement with China and for administering the area thereafter. He advised that Japan's leadership must first resolve internal conflicts and administrative disorder within such peace settlement areas (hwap'yong chigu) in China by establishing a single, unified agency capable of efficiently coordinating and implementing imperial policies. This, he argued, required overcoming rivalries and divisions among the army, the navy, or diplomatic corps, and executing policy decisions with both clarity and speed. Ugaki further proposed that any Chinese government formed within these peace settlement zones should be granted the highest possible degree of autonomy in managing domestic affairs. However, in matters concerning imperial defense and military requirements, it was to cooperate closely with Japan. The most critical issues or regions, he emphasized, should remain under Japan's direct control. At this stage, Ugaki still tried to save the empire by ending the war with China. With the "stable" condition in Korea and Manchuria and abundant resources in China, he hoped that Japan might conclude the war without irreparably damaging its imperial standing.³²⁾

31) Ibid.

32) Ibid. (check)

As 1945 began, Ugaki recognized Japan's impending defeat and devoted his efforts to exploring ways to preserve the Japanese nation.³³⁾ He closely followed information regarding the Allied powers' potential policies toward Japan after its surrender.³⁴⁾ It is disconcerting to observe how quickly and radically Ugaki revised the narrative of Japan's war in Asia and completely denying Japan's responsibility for the conflict and the atrocities it inflicted upon other Asian people. Equally striking is how expeditiously he sought to detach Japan from Asia and reorient it toward the West, envisioning renewed connections with Western power and capital. Ugaki's writings illuminate the mindset, resolve, and narratives of Japanese leaders as they sought to survive defeat and rebuild Japan. If Japan's wartime decisions to invade Asia and the United States had been reckless, its efforts to conclude the war and mitigate the catastrophic consequences of defeat were, to some extent, deliberate and effectively executed.

A week before Japan's surrender, Ugaki composed an essay titled "*The Meaning of the Great East Asian War in World History*," drafted on August 2 and completed on August 11, shortly after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Though his argument amounted largely to sophistry, his underlying purpose seemed to be persuading the Japanese to abandon the idea of fighting to the death against an Allied invasion. In the essay, Ugaki attributed the war's origins to an inevitable, almost mystical force in world history, portraying Japan as defending Asia from destructive global currents unleashed by Western capitalism. He argued that, following the First World War, plutocratic powers expanded arms production under Roosevelt's New Deal and compelled nations such as China to buy their weapons. The USSR, Nazi Germany, and the UK, he claimed, further fueled conflicts—including the war in China and the Spanish Civil War—to consume these armaments, ultimately transforming the European conflict into the Second World War. Within this narrative, Japan appeared as a nation fighting selflessly for Asia's defense and its own dignity. Ugaki thus concluded, shamelessly, that Japan bore no responsibility for the war and harbored no ambitions of world conquest.³⁵⁾

Ugaki argued that the Great East Asian War should not be judged by its military outcomes but by its broader historical significance. The true meaning of the war, he claimed, lay beyond the battlefield. He defined its aims as the restoration and defense of Asia, the liberation of all colonies, coexistence and co-prosperity with India, the construction of a moral and righteous state (*toūi kukka*), and the fulfillment of Japan's imperial ideal of "bringing the Eight Corners of the World under One Roof." He further asserted that the ideals embodied in the Atlantic Charter, the Allied conferences, and even the Potsdam Declaration were

33) Ugaki Bunsho, no. 269, February 1945.

34) Ugaki Bunsho, no. 267, February 18, 1945.

35) Ugaki Bunsho, no. 272, August 11, 1945.

consistent with the founding principles of the Great East Asia. From this perspective, Ugaki contended that the primary objectives of the Great East Asian War had already been realized and that the Japanese should take pride in its historical achievements. Likely referring to Japan's coup d'état against French rule in Vietnam in March 1945, he insisted that Japan had fulfilled its mission by helping bring independence to Vietnam. Any subsequent fighting, he argued, would be futile—a mere war of attrition (*somōjōn*) against the enemy's overwhelming material power. Ugaki described the devastating force of British and American weaponry, culminating in the atomic bombings, as evidence of the destructive forces driving humanity toward annihilation. Such forces, he warned, would plunge the world into chaos and the extermination of humankind, regardless of victory or defeat. Ugaki claimed that this devastation was wholly unrelated to the original ideals of the Great East Asian War.³⁶⁾

Ugaki warned that the Japanese must prevent their homeland from becoming a battleground. To wait passively and seek victory on Japanese soil, he argued, would invite the same brutal fate that had befallen Germany; an Allied invasion conducted with "horrifying and devilish" methods would profane the purity of the Yamato nation and lead to its bloody extermination. He called for the rejection of any such plan and proposed instead what he described as a new strategy to "complete" the Great East Asian War—one aimed at the moral renewal of the world and the redemption of humanity. In redefining defeat as moral enlightenment, Ugaki attempted to turn Japan's surrender into an ideological victory, recasting the collapse of empire as a form of spiritual triumph. He insisted that burdening the imperial household with further destruction would be disloyal, and that military leaders must should preserve the kokutai by assuming full responsibility for the war. Accordingly, Ugaki advocated immediate peace negotiations. He claimed the Japan's essential objectives had already been achieved and urged the abandonment of further destructive resistance, even at the cost of accepting disadvantageous terms. He deemed full withdrawal from China and Manchuria, the removal of Japanese forces from the Pacific mandates, drastic reductions of the standing army, and the closure or conversion of military industries as acceptable and necessary measures. In his view, an early peace—even if deeply unfavorable—was the only means to dismantle the old order and enable the fundamental renewal of Japan.³⁷⁾

Interestingly, Ugaki proposed that Japan discard its outdated technologies and swiftly adopt British and American methods, relying on their military and industrial power to rebuild the nation and renew Japan's global mission under the Imperial Way. This abrupt turn from wartime anti-Americanism had already appeared in a document he preserved, titled "The Jewish Movements for World Hegemony," dated September 1943. Ugaki kept this paper in his collection, after removing the author's name. The document listed prominent Jewish figures

36) Ibid.

37) Ibid.

involved in Western politics, the Russian Revolution, and the Freemason movement, as well as networks of Freemasonry in Japan and the Far East. Its sixth section, focused on Japan's "reconstruction," contained proposals strikingly aligned with Japan's later postwar trajectory. It advocated revising nationality laws to allow foreigners—particularly Jewish people—to obtain Japanese citizenship and recommended introducing Freemasonry's global networks into Japan by connecting influential figures in politics, business, media, religion, academia, and the arts. The paper further proposed establishing a Freemason headquarters in Tokyo as a regional hub for Asia. Economically, the document advised Japan to revive its industry by attracting American (Jewish) capital, adopting the U.S. dollar, and liberalizing the economy to facilitate foreign investment in major corporations and trading firms. It also encouraged Japan to pursue free trade, expand industrial output, and modernize its merchant fleet, while promoting industrialization and emigration to reduce agricultural overpopulation.³⁸⁾

Finally, on August 14, 1945, Ugaki wrote a treatise entitled "The Clearing Up of the Old Japan and the Construction of the New Japan."³⁹⁾ In another essay from early September, 1945, he declared that the fate of the empire no longer rested on "one hundred million" but on "seventy million" nationals. The rise and fall of the empire, he argued, depended on these seven hundred million citizens who, regardless of their gender and age, should take personal initiative to rebuild both the empire and a new Japan. The foremost task, he emphasized, was political reform. While many attributed Japan's defeat to the incompetence of its military and engineers, Ugaki placed responsibility instead on the weakness and inertia of the political sphere, which he believed had reduced the Japanese people to a condition of violence, inferiority, and incapability. He therefore called on Japan to reform such politics.⁴⁰⁾

Conclusion: A New Asianism Gesturing Toward Being-With.

When Pan-Asianism still held political vitality and reached Asian audiences at the turn of the twentieth century, it addressed their inner anxieties, above all, the fragility of their cultures confronting the encroachment of Western "civilization." It momentarily opened a discursive space in which Asians could deliberate their own internal and external dilemmas and pursue solutions. Yet such moments were fleeting. Japanese variants of Pan-Asianism soon enabled and acquiesced in Japan's imperial expansion across Asia. The dominance of imperial nationalism foreclosed the political possibilities for Asians to revise Pan-Asianism toward co-existence or to reconcile their diverse national and racial interests for the sake of co-prosperity. A European female philosopher reflected on existence and co-existence in profoundly ethical terms:

"There is a bond between "I" and "You," not in the sense of subject-object relations, at it is in human sciences, but Lévinas' responsibility for acher, for the otherness and difference...The subject-object relation to man leads inevitably to tattooed numbers on the forearms on the prisoners in the concentration camps. No one can remain hidden in his interior, the interiority is impossible. To "enown" (ereignen) oneself and the world is not in contradiction with this Lévinas' responsibility, the other is identical with me, we are one thing while preserving the otherness of the other."⁴¹⁾

Her words illuminate the possibility that a reimagined Pan-Asianism might have aspired not to dominance but to being-with: to an existence grounded in responsibility for the other. Japan's wartime Pan-Asianism invoked liberation from Western colonialism and promised economic co-prosperity among Asians. Yet in practice, the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperty remained strictly subordinate to Japan's wartime imperative. Under this imperial priority of war and production, both human lives and natural resources were mobilized to sustain "direct war power" for combats and production.

The legacy of Japan's imperialist war and the manner in which the Allied forces orchestrated its defeat intensified nationalism and reinforced the nation-state framework of East Asian politics, constraining the imagination of co-existence beyond its bounds. At the height of wartime Pan-Asianism, Japan proclaimed racial and national integration under a single banner, yet such unity was defined by the material exigencies of war and by "the subject-object" relations between the imperial war machine and the human beings, Japanese or otherwise, subsumed within it. After the Second World War, East Asia was once again drawn into Western ideological frameworks, communism and liberal capitalism without forging a shared foundation for co-existence. Ideas of self-defense against Western capitalism or of racial equality vis a vis the white West did not yield principles of co-existence or co-prosperity. On the contrary, they fostered militarized visions that prioritized sovereignty over life and justified the material and psychological mobilization of populations in its defense. Japan's Greater Co-Prosperty Sphere, rooted in imperial mythology, proved culturally insular and ideologically opaque to other Asians.

After Japan's postwar reintegration into the West, Asianism remained unresolved, fractured by contradictions and bereft of viable proponents. The enduring fixation on sovereignty and military strength, coupled with the absence of an ethic of coexistence, laid the groundwork for renewed wars and militarism in the region. Yet this absence also reveals what remains to be imagined. Any nation or group seeking to imagine an alternative Asian framework distinct from the West must reckon with Japan's wartime Asianism, its ambitions, its collapse, and its legacies. Co-existence and co-agency must stand as the minimal foundation for imagining

38) Ugaki Bunsho, no. 248, September 1943.

39) Ugaki Bunsho, no. 273. August. 14, 1945.

40) Ugaki Bunsho, no. 275, September 1945.

41) Anna Hogenová, "Existence and Co-existence as a Phenomenon," Paideia, no. 2, vol. XVII, 2020, p. 5.

a new Asian co-prosperity, one that transcends nationalism and gestures instead toward being-with, toward a shared yet differentiated belonging.

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가치 경쟁 길들이기: 관계적 비지배를 통한 평화적 공존

Taming Value Rivalries: Peaceful Coexistence through Relational Non-domination

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Abstract

This paper advances the conception of “relational non-domination” as a regulative principle that can more effectively steer the emerging value rivalries, particularly among great powers in the New Cold War, toward peaceful coexistence. More specifically, first, by examining the “Old Cold War” framework embedded in the discourse of the “New Cold War,” I emphasize that overcoming the present impasse requires not the repetition of an outdated strategic paradigm but rather a multifaceted understanding of value rivalries among great powers. Second, by analyzing the misguided expectations and practices of globalization, I explain why a return to the nation state framework is necessary to move beyond such confrontations. Third, by highlighting the language of “anti-slavery” as a minimalist shared normativity across cultures, I propose relational non-domination as a regulative principle for peaceful coexistence that can both give voice to weaker states and constrain the arbitrary exercise of power by great powers. Finally, by defining relational non-domination as a constitutive condition for establishing a deliberative stance among nation-states in asymmetrical relationships, I will explore practical ways in which ongoing AI-driven arms races may be redirected toward confidence-building measures.

*강연자의 요청에 따라 논문은 프로그램북에 게재하지 않을 예정이오니 양해 부탁드립니다.

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